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MURDER, MINORITY VICTIMS, AND
MERCY
AYA GRUBER*

Should the jury have acquitted George Zimmerman of
Trayvon Martin's murder? Should enraged husbands receive
a pass for killing their cheating wives? Should the law treat
a homosexual advance as adequate provocation for
killing? Criminal law scholars generally answer these
questions with a resounding "no." Theorists argue that
criminal laws should not reflect bigoted perceptions of
African Americans, women, and gays by permitting judges
and jurors to treat those who kill racial and gender
minorities with undue mercy. According to this view, murder
defenses like provocation should be restricted to ensure that
those who kill minority victims receive the harshest
sanctions available. Equality is thus achieved by ratcheting
up punishment. There is a similar bias in the applicationof
the death penalty, where those who kill racial minorities
receive more leniency than those who kill whites and are
often spared execution. But the typical liberal response here
is to call for abolition rather than more frequent executions.
Equality is thus achieved by ratcheting down punishment.
This Article asserts that the divergence between the accepted
scholarly positions on the provocation defense and capital
punishment can be explained by provocation critics' choice to
concentrate on spectacular individual instances of leniency
toward those who kill gender minorities and death penalty
theorists' tendency to view the entire institution of capital
punishment as racist and retrograde. The Article then
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provides the institutional sketch of noncapital murder law
currently missing from provocation analysis by discussing
sentencing practices, the demographic composition of murder
defendants, and the provocation defense's potential role as a
safety valve. It concludes that inserting institutional
analysis into the critical assessment of provocation might
undermine the prevailing scholarly dogma supporting proprosecution reform.
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INTRODUCTION
The power to be lenient is the power to discriminate.

For criminal law professors like me, criminal lawyers, and
even the public at large, the spring of 2012 was the spring of
Trayvon Martin and George Zimmerman. Not since O.J.
Simpson, or maybe more accurately Casey Anthony, has a
criminal case captured the public imagination and created such
outrage and controversy. 2 The shooting certainly incorporates
all the ingredients of a media spectacle: an innocent, teenage
1. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987) (quoting K. DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 170 (1973)).

2. See generally The Trayvon Martin Case, HUFFINGTON POST, http://
huffingtonpost.com/news/trayvon-martin (web portal dedicated to the Trayvon
Martin Case).
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African American victim; a "white-Hispanic," generally noncriminal, neighborhood-watch leader defendant; and a lax
reaction from police in a racially-divided community.3 Had
Trayvon Martin or George Zimmerman possessed an extensive
criminal record, had this been a case of black-on-black violence,
or had the police arrested immediately, the story may not have
provoked the collective ire, but rather festered in the social
media graveyard like so many other crime reports.
Once the case made national headlines, the expert public
commentary, at least from the political center-left, was swift
and unified. 4 The apparent problem is Florida's "Stand Your
Ground" law, which removes the duty to retreat before using
deadly force. 5 The logic of the critique is perfect in its
simplicity: Zimmerman shooting Trayvon and the police's
reaction were unjust; the stand your ground law enabled these
events; and therefore, the stand your ground law is unjust. 6
The center-left and progressive opinions on the case are
strikingly consistent, holding that broad self-defense laws that
benefit racist or racialist 7 killers must be tightened up,
operatively making it easier for prosecutors to obtain murder

convictions. 8 The bulk of the defense of Florida's stand your
3. See id.
4. See generally id. (blog posts from minority and progressive commentators
criticizing the "Stand Your Ground" law and police handling of Zimmerman's
case); infra note 8.
5. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2012) ("A person who is not engaged in an
unlawful activity and who is attacked in any other place where he or she has a
right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and
meet force with force . . .").
6. In support of this conclusion, proponents have offered evidence of other
unjust stand your ground cases. See, e.g., Kameel Stanley & Connie Humburg,
Many Killers Who Go Free with Florida 'Stand Your Ground'Law Have History of
Violence, TAMPA BAY TIMES, July 22, 2012, http://www.tampabay.cominews/
courts/criminallmany-killers-who-go-free-with-florida-stand-your-ground-lawhave-history/1241378 (chronicling cases of abusers, gang members, and other
"habitual offenders" utilizing the defense); Nils Kongshaug, Trayvon Martin's
Death Puts Florida's "Stand Your Ground" Law Under New Scrutiny,
ABCNEWS.COM (March 25, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/trayvon-martinstand-ground-laws-scrutiny-florida-shooting/story?id=15988474 (quoting Florida
State Attorney as stating that the law is used by "thugs and gangs and drug
dealers").
7. A racialist killer might not harbor conscious racial enmity but may be
influenced by negative racial stereotypes, such as "blacks are criminals." See
Peggy Cooper Davis, Law as Microagression,98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1570 n.51 (1989)
(using "the term 'racialist' to describe judgments controlled by racial stereotypes
without adopting the accusatory tone suggested by the word 'racist"').
8. See NAACP Responds to Texas A&M Study Showing Danger of Stand-
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ground law accordingly comes from neo-conservatives, tea
partiers, neighborhood warriors, and a few intrepid defense
attorneys and civil libertarians. 9
The mainstream liberal/progressivelo position condemns
murder defenses that "devalue" minorities and women and
allow jurors and judges to treat defendants who kill such
victims with disproportionate mercy. It calls on the law to
eliminate or narrow these defenses to ensure that such
defendants receive the harshest sanctions available.'1
Progressive theorists, for example, have advanced a powerful
argument calling for abolition or limitation of the provocation
(heat-of-passion) defense because controlling and abusive men

Your-Ground Laws, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/press/entry/naacp-responds-toNAACP
(quoting
texas-am-study-showing-danger-of-stand-your-ground-laws
President Ben Jealous as stating, "'stand-your-ground' legislation does more harm
than good"); Sean Lengell, Black Caucus Members offer Resolution to Honor
Trayvon Martin, WASH. TIMES INSIDE POL. BLOG (April 4, 2012,
6:46 PM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/inside-politics/2012/apr/4/black(noting Congressional black
caucus-members-offer-resolution-honor-trayvol
caucus's call for law's repeal). Cf. ACLU Reacts to Murder ChargeAgainst George
Zimmerman in Trayvon Martin Shooting, AM. CiV. LIBERTIES UNION,
http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/aclu-reacts-murder-charge-against-georgezimmerman-trayvon-martin-shooting (discussing ACLU support for the outside
investigation that led to Zimmerman's arrest).
9. See Gun Owners of America Chief Defends George Zimmerman: Trayvon
Martin was 'Assailant,' DEMOCRATICUNDERGROUND.COM (Mar. 26, 2012),
http://www.democraticunderground.com/1002472118 (quoting executive director
of the organization as stating, "Martin 'gave up his rights"'); Judson Phillips,
Injustice: The Liberal Lynch Mob and the George Zimmerman Case, TEA PARTY
NATION (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.teapartynation.com/forum/topics/injusticethe-liberal-lynch-mob-and-the-george-zimmerman-case (asserting that "Trayvon
Martin start[ed] a fight [and]caused his death"); Alan Dershowitz,
Drop George Zimmerman's Murder Charge, NYDAILYNEWS.COM (May 18,
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/drop-george-zimmerman-murder2012),
charge-article-1. 1080161?localLinksEnabled=false (stating that an "ethical"
prosecutor would drop the murder charge).
10. This Article uses the term "liberal" in its colloquial sense as pertaining to
a politically left/progressive agenda and not to denote adherence to the philosophy
of Lockean neo-classical liberalism. Progressive legal scholars harbor a skepticism
of authoritarian criminal justice see infra Part IV.A, but they are also attuned to
the ways in which seemingly neutral laws reflect and reinforce racial and gender
hierarchies.
11. The Trayvon Martin case is strikingly similar to the Bernhard Goetz case,
in which a white subway passenger was acquitted on self-defense grounds of an
admitted execution-style shooting of four black youths. See People v. Goetz, 497
N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986). Commentators problematize New York's broad self-defense
law for allowing the jury to deem Goetz's actions reasonable. See, e.g., Cynthia
Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of
Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996) [hereinafter Race and Self-Defense].
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who kill their female partners can utilize it to mitigate murder
charges to manslaughter.1 2 Having diagnosed the problem as
one of gender disparity-female victims are uniquely
disadvantaged by the provocation defensel 3 -progressives
propose to ratchet up punishment to ensure that male
perpetrators of intimate killings are punished to the same
degree as other killers. 14 In fact, when it comes to wife-killers
who claim provocation and racialist killers who claim selfdefense (like Zimmerman), liberals regard ratcheting up as the
sole means of achieving equal treatment of minority victims. 15
Discriminatory leniency also occurs outside the
provocation and self-defense contexts. Death penalty experts
observe a similar disparity in capital punishment
administration where killers of black victims receive
disproportionate mercy and are spared execution. 16 If
progressive death penalty discourse followed the same
trajectory as discourse on intimate homicide and Trayvon
Martin, liberals would call for a ratchet-up solution to ensure
that black victims in capital cases receive equal treatment.
They would propose reforms like returning to a mandatory
death penalty, race-conscious prosecutorial mandates, or
special victim advocates in minority victim cases.17 Instead,

12.

See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND

FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003) [hereinafter REASONABLE MAN]; Emily
L. Miller, (Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender, and the Model
Penal Code, 50 EMORY L.J. 665 (2001); Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress:
Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997);
Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who
Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71 (1992).
13. Critics have also noted that LGBT victims are disadvantaged by the
defense. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Robert B. Mison,
Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as
Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133 (1992) (critiquing the provocation
defense on sexual orientation grounds). There is less evidence that those who kill
minority victims particularly benefit from the provocation defense. But see
Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as
Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1301 (2004) (describing society's
tolerance for post-September 11 [racial] violence as reflecting heat-of-passionbased reasoning).
14. See Miller, supra note 12, at 669 (stating that broad provocation laws
permit jurors "to give voice to their own prejudices").
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, CapitalPunishment,
and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1436-38 (1988) (discussing
"level up" solutions (more executions) to the problem of death penalty disparity).
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commentators point to the racial disparity in the death penalty
as a ground to uniformly ratchet down punishment and abolish
capital punishment.18 This illustrates that ratcheting up is not
the exclusive method of remedying disparity. Every inequality
case "poses the problem of whether to 'level up' or 'level
down."" 9 Provocation theorists, like death penalty scholars,
could propose to remedy provocation's gender disparity by
making the heat-of-passion defense exceedingly easy to satisfy
for all defendants.
This Article explores why liberals advance ratchet-up,
severity-enhancing remedies to address victim disparities
caused by broad murder defenses like provocation, but choose
ratchet-down, leniency-enhancing remedies to address victim
disparities caused by discretion in capital punishment. The
striking divergence between progressive provocation and death
penalty analyses, I argue, can be attributed to a difference in
focus. Provocation critics tend to concentrate on terrible
individual homicides. Reading the facts of such sensational
cases triggers not just the egalitarian desire to treat women
and LGBT victims like other victims, but the retributive desire
to see the perpetrators suffer the highest penalty under law. 20
By contrast, death penalty scholars start with a set of baseline
objections to any penal structure that permits execution. 21
When assessing the death penalty disparity, they look at
capital
punishment
institutionally-its
philosophical
groundings, 22 its larger effects on subordinated groups and
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle: Remedying
ProsecutorialDiscriminationAgainst Black Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998
SUP. CT. REV. 145, 161-62. In civil antidiscrimination law, progressives generally
prefer "level up" solutions that mandate minority participation in benefits over
"level down" solutions that deprive everyone of benefits. See, e.g., Deborah L.
Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of Leveling Down
in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2004). The criminal context is
complicated by the fact that "level up" proposals that purportedly benefit minority
victims simultaneously burden perpetrators, who are often minorities. See infra
notes 290-295 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (narratives of spectacular
provocation cases).
21. See Matthew B. Robinson, The Real Death Penalty: Capital Punishment
According to the Experts, 45 NO. 2 CRIM. LAW BULLETIN ART 3 (2009) (surveying
"expert" death penalty scholars and finding that 80 percent indicated opposition
to capital punishment and 9 percent indicated support).
22. See, e.g., Claire Finkelstein, A ContractarianArgument Against the Death
Penalty, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (2006) (setting forth an a priori moral
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communities, 23 and its place within an evolved global
civilization. 24 Seen in an institutional light, capital-sentencing
decisions that reflect and reinforce racial hierarchy confirm the
morally fraught nature of the entire capital punishment
enterprise. 25
If provocation critics focused more globally on non-capital
murder sentencing and its negative effects on individuals and
society, they might also hesitate before prescribing ratchet-up,
carceral solutions to provocation's disparities. 26 The trajectory
of murder sentences, the racial composition of murder
arrestees, and the likely role provocation plays within this
institution renders dubious the proposition that abolishing or
restricting provocation furthers anti-subordination goals and
progressive values. Provocation scholars' focus on specific cases
of gendered and racialized violence 27 instead of the aggregate
argument against the death penalty); infra note 209 and accompanying text. But
see Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?
Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 750 (2005)
(asserting that if capital punishment really deters, it may be "morally
obligatory").
23. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families: The
Collateral Damage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005 (2001)
(discussing deleterious effects of criminal enforcement on black communities);
infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
24. See Harry Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104
YALE L.J. 39, 45-46 (1994) (asserting that the death penalty's legality should be
measured "in part, against international norms").
25. See, e.g., Ronald J. Tabak, How Empirical Studies Can Affect Positively
the Politics of the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1431, 1431 (1998)
(characterizing racial statistics as a weapon in the "arsenal" against capital
punishment); see infra Part III.B.
26. Although illustrating the difference between insular and institutional foci
could be made by juxtaposing liberal death penalty analysis with either liberal
self-defense or provocation analysis, for clarity and brevity, this Article focuses on
comparing death penalty analysis with provocation analysis. Notwithstanding
scholarship on the Goetz case, see supra note 11, there seems to be more critique
of provocation law. Moreover, the differences between murder and manslaughter
and execution and imprisonment are a matter of degree, whereas self-defense is
all-or-nothing. Finally, the Trayvon Martin case has already prompted some
institutional examination of self-defense law. See U.S. COMM. ON CIv. RTS.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION: STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS & RACIAL BIAS 1 (2012)
(proposing to study racial disparities in stand your ground laws, but not seeking
to examine the global effect of restricting self-defense).
27. While some theorists discuss the effect of broad provocation formulas on
intimate homicide cases in the aggregate, they limit their analysis to male-onfemale intimate homicide cases. See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
However, they generally propose remedies that affect all provocation cases
without analyzing how provocation law affects defendants in non-intimate
homicide cases. See infra Part II.B.
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effect of provocation law on offenders and sentencing explains
why these progressives support reforms that bolster a penal
system they otherwise passionately criticize. 28
Part I of this Article provides a brief sketch of provocation
law. Part II analyzes the progressive critique that the
provocation defense invites discriminatory mercy toward those
who kill gender minorities and the ratchet-up proposals to
remedy the disparity. Part III describes the racial critique of
the death penalty and demonstrates how the ratchet-down
solution is a product of institutional reasoning. Part IV
provides an institutional description of non-capital murder law
by examining the radical transformation in murder sentencing
over the last several decades, its effect on prison populations

and marginalized communities, and how provocation law
operates within this structure. The conclusion discusses why
viewing non-capital murder law institutionally might move

liberal-minded scholars to depart from the current dogma that
lawmakers should narrow the provocation defense so that
killers of minority victims receive harsher punishment. 29
I.

THE PROVOCATION DEFENSE IN BRIEF

Criminal law theorists have long debated whether a
defendant's anger and passion should mitigate murder charges
to manslaughter and whether a victim's emotion-inciting but
not illegal conduct should partially justify his demise. 30
Theorists and jurists also struggle with whether provocation
should principally concern the defendant's mental or emotional
28. The issue of insular versus institutional focus exists in other criminal law
contexts, like domestic violence law. Compare Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose:
Mandated Victim Participationin Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1850, 1881-82 (1996) ("[W]e cannot allow violence to go unchecked under the
rationale that state intervention is always racist, ethnocentric, or classist."), with
LINDA MILLS, FROM INSULT TO INJURY:

RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO

INTIMATE ABUSE 31 (2003) (noting that men of color are prosecuted for domestic
abuse at "disturbingly disproportionate rates").
29. See infra note 57 and accompanying text (observing popularity of this
view).
30. Joshua Dressier asks, "[Why is the impassioned killer consistently
treated more leniently than the calm killer?" Rethinking Heat of Passion: A
Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 422 (1982)

[hereinafter Rethinking Passion]. See also Mitchell N. Berman & Ian P. Farrell,
Provocation Manslaughteras PartialJustificationand PartialExcuse, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1027, 1031 (2011) (noting that the debate over provocation has

lasted "several decades but [is] yet to bear satisfactory fruit.").
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state (making it operate as an excuse), the quality of the
victim's act (making it operate as a justification), both, or
neither. 31 One factor contributing to the philosophical
complexity is that there are many different permutations of the
defense. Some formulations strongly focus on the defendant's
state of mind, and others are preoccupied with the nature of
the victim's behavior. 32 This Part takes a quick look at different
provocation formulations and the scholarly debate over the
defense.
Provocation law vacillates between a retributivist
emphasis on defendant culpability and a "transactional" view
of criminal law that accounts for both parties' contributions to
a criminal event. 33 The different formulations of provocation
thus exist along a spectrum from victim-centered (emphasizing
the nature of the victim's conduct) to defendant-centered
(focusing on the defendant's subjective intent and
circumstances). 34 Traditional provocation law limits the
defense to discrete

categories

of purportedly

provocative

behavior, typically mutual combat, false arrest, physical
assault, and adultery.35 Many jurisdictions further specify that
words alone, no matter how incensing, cannot constitute
31. See Symposium, The Nature, Structure, and Function of Heat of
Passion/Provocationas a Criminal Defense, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, et seq.
(2009) [hereinafter Provocation Symposium] (several articles debating the nature
of provocation as justification or excuse); Dan Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum,
Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996)
(provocation is neither justification nor excuse). See, e.g., Rethinking Passion,
supra note 30 (provocation is a partial excuse); A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of
Provocation,35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292 (1976) (provocation is a partial justification).
32. See infra note 34.
33. See George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at
War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1538 (2002) (stating
that provocation law shows "it is possible to distribute guilt among the parties to
a criminal transaction"); Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs: The Case for a General
Criminal Defense Based on Wrongful Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims'
Rights, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 645, 677 n.150 (2003) [hereinafter Victim Wrongs]
(observing that certain provocation formulations focus on "the entire transaction
including the victim's behavior").
34. See Nourse, supra note 12, at 1342 (observing that provocation's "two
poles" are the defendant-centered MPC formulation and the victim-centered,
traditional categorical view).
35. See id. at 1341 (calling these categories the "nineteenth century four");
Victim Wrongs, supra note 33, at 677 n.153 (listing traditional categories). See,
e.g., People v. Garcia, 651 N.E.2d 100, 110 (Ill. 1995) (limiting provocation to
physical assault or injury, mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest, and adultery);
Rogers v. State, 819 So.2d 643, 662 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) (limiting provocation to
witnessed adultery and imminent assault of the defendant or a close relative).
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adequate provocation. 36 These formulations emphasize the
quality of the victim's act as much as or more than the
defendant's actual emotional state. 37 On the other end of the
spectrum is the Model Penal Code's (MPC) extreme emotional
disturbance defense, which mitigates murder to manslaughter
when the defendant acts "under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance." 38 The MPC contains no
requirements as to the form of provoking behavior and thus
focuses nearly exclusively on the defendant's emotional state.
In the past, liberal criminal law scholars tended to view
the defendant-centered approach to provocation as the forwardthinking view,39 reflecting the general precept that criminal
law should be about the defendant's intent and actions. 40 It is
true that some commentators regarded even the narrow
categorical approach as over-inclusive, allowing too many fully
culpable killers to claim provocation. 4 1 Indeed, the pacifist view
is that any killing not in valid self-defense is fully morally
condemnable. 42 Nevertheless, progressive criminal law scholars
historically regarded the categorical approach as underinclusive, asserting that juries might reasonably find victim
behavior not included in the categories to be adequately
36. See, e.g., Cassels v. State, 92 P.3d 951, 960 (Colo. 2004) ("[W]ords that
revile, disparage, or insult ... can never rise to the level of legal provocation.");
State v. Shane, 590 N.E.2d 272, 277 (Ohio 1992); Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718,
721 (Md. 1991) (same).
37. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, MisunderstandingProvocation, 43 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 143, 161 (2009) (observing that the categorical approach "requires moralsocial assessment of the reasons for the defendant's emotion"). But see JEREMY
HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 89 (1992) (stating that categories
served the "evidentiary" function of corroborating defendants' claims of passion).
38. AMERICAN LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1980)
[hereinafter MPC].
39. See Nourse, supra note 12, at 1339 (characterizing the MPC as "the height
of the liberal reform movement").
40. See id.; Rethinking Passion, supra note 30, at 460 (stating that the
doctrine recognizes that a provoked actor "is not fully blameworthy"). Cf. Payne v.
Tennessee, 505 U.S. 801, 859 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Court's acceptance of victim impact evidence in capital sentencing on the ground
that "[t]he victim is not on trial").
41. See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal
Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 636 (1981) (stating that jibes, assaults, or adultery
would never provoke an ordinary man to kill); HORDER, supra note 37, at 178
(asserting that equating "action in moments of unexpected anguish" with
reasonable action is a "sham").
42. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished
Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 33 (1984) ("Reasonable people do not
kill no matter how much they are provoked").
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provocative. 43 Taking a cue from the 1968 MPC revision,
several jurisdictions shifted away from the traditional
approach to "enlightened" defendant-regarding versions of
provocation law." Of course, focusing on defendant culpability
does not answer the question of when a defendant is less
culpable. Many experts and jurisdictions abide by the view that
the provocation defense should only be available when a
"reasonable person" would have been moved to kill. 45
Requiring the defendant's actions to be reasonable is more
victim-centered than a purely subjective approach. If the
reasonable person is generally nonviolent, only the most
extreme victim conduct is adequately provoking. 46 Then again,
a broad construction of reasonableness permits defendants to
claim reasonable provocation even when the victim's conduct
was not wrongful. 47 As such, reasonableness is also subject to
under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness objections. To the
victim advocate, the fluidity of reasonableness can undermine
43. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Comment, When "Heterosexual" Men Kill
"Homosexual" Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the
"Reasonable Man" Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 733 (1995)
[hereinafter ProvocationReflections] (noting with approval states' shift away from
"rigid" categories); Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I-Provocation,
Emotional Disturbance,and the Model Penal Code, 27 B.C. L. Rev. 243, 249 (1986)
(asserting that the jury should decide provocation's adequacy). See also MPC &
COMMENTARIES § 210.3(1)(b) (1980) (stating that the drafters "[r]ejected the
categorical approach in order to avoid arbitrary exclusion of some [mitigating]
circumstances").
44. See Nourse, supra note 12, at 1340, n.52-55 (discussing this shift and
citing statutes and cases); REASONABLE MAN, supra note 12, at 284; Kahan &
Nussbaum, supra note 31, at 309 ("Modern authorities have tended to abandon
categorical definitions of adequate provocation.").
45. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2 (West 2012) ("reasonable person"); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:31(1) (2011) ("average person"); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.001(1)
(2010) ("person of ordinary temperament"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.050
(LexisNexis 2009) ("reasonable person"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.44(1) (West 2010)
("ordinarily constituted person"). See REASONABLE MAN, supra note 12, at 235
(characterizing the purpose of reasonableness as creating "uniformity and
fairness").
46. See A.P. SIMESTER & G.R. SULLIVAN, CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND
DOCTRINE §10.5(b)(iii) at 348 (2d ed. 2003) (asserting that the reasonable person
would rarely "intentionally kill, in peacetime, except in self-defense"). Cf. GEORGE
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 247 (1978) ("[Tlhe reasonable person does
not kill at all, even under provocation.").
47. See generally infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text (discussing the
critique of reasonableness); Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitor: Of Reasonable
Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV.
781, 789-90 (1994) (discussing the "reasonable racist" problem and noting that
"prevailing beliefs and attitudes may fall short of" moral attitudes).
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the interests of victims who engaged in innocent behavior. 48
From the defense perspective, the standard invites juries to
view the defendant's decisions through the lens of their own
experiences instead of understanding his life circumstances. 49
The MPC shifts the inquiry from the question of adequate
provocation to whether the defendant acted under a condition
of extreme emotional disturbance.50 It adopts a defendantcentered perspective, in which blameworthiness corresponds
directly with capacity to form intent. 51 However, even the MPC
does not completely escape the lure of reasonableness, as it
requires that there be a "reasonable explanation or excuse" for
the defendant's diminished mental state. 52 Today, defendantcentered versions of the provocation defense have largely
supplanted the traditional approach. 53 Currently, eleven states
48. See Cathryn Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical
Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 32 (1986)
(observing that subjective reasonableness might encourage killing "innocent"
victims); Race and Self-Defense, supra note 11, at 385 (arguing that under
subjective reasonableness, defendants' beliefs "outweigh all other considerations").
49. See Singer, supra note 43, at 278; cf. Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime,
Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1295, 1310 (2001) (criticizing criminal law for repressing "the reality of social
influences" in favor of a "shaky idea of free will") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
50. See MPC § 210.3(1)(b).
51. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Cf. Stephen P. Garvey, SelfDefense and the Mistaken Racist, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 119, 135-36 n.45 (2008)
("(N]egligence is (most often) an illegitimate basis upon which to premise
retributive punishment").
52. MPC § 210.3(1)(b); see also Rethinking Passion, supra note 30, at 468
(setting forth a defense based primarily on loss of self-control but retaining
reasonableness). There are formulations of the diminished capacity defense that
are purely subjective and thus represent the far end of the defendant-centered
perspective. Wholly dispensing with reasonableness makes the normative quality
of the victim's behavior almost irrelevant to the question of appropriate
punishment. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13 (West 2012); Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 552.015.2(8), 552.030(3) (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-2 (LexisNexis
2012); ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.020 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704-401
(LexisNexis 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 38 (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. §
46-14-102 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305(1). This extremely liberal position
limits punishment and allows for consideration of a defendant's personal
background. Compare David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the CriminalLaw, 49 S.
CAL. L. REV. 385, 401-03 (1976) ("[P]eople turn to crime for reasons such as
economic survival, a sense of excitement or accomplishment, and an outlet for
frustration, desperation, and rage."), with Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of
Welfare Criminology:A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1249-50
(1976).
53. It appears that only two states, Alabama and Illinois, retain any
categorical restrictions on provoking behavior. See, e.g., Riggs v. State, 2013 WL

2014]

MURDER, MINORITY VICTIMS, AND MERCY

141

employ a version of the MPC extreme emotional disturbance
defense. 54 Accordingly, the vast majority of jurisdictions'
provocation formulations focus to varying degrees on the
"adequacy" of provoking conduct and in turn, the
"reasonableness" of the defendant's overriding passion. 55
II. DISCRIMINATORY LENIENCY IN PROVOCATION LAW
The various provocation defense formulations have and
continue to generate "passionate" debate. 56 In recent decades,
one of the most compelling critiques of the defense has come,
not from tough-on-crime conservatives, but progressive
scholars, predominantly feminist and queer theorists concerned
with the defense's operation in cases involving female and
LGBT victims. 57 These theorists (referred to collectively as

1859018, at *8 (Ala. Crim. App. May 3, 2013) ("[T]his Court recognize[s] the
following three situations in which murder may be reduced to manslaughter on
the basis that there existed legal provocation: '(1) when the accused witnesses his
or her spouse in the act of adultery; (2) when the accused is assaulted or faced
with an imminent assault on himself; and (3) when the accused witnesses an
assault on a family member or close relative."') (quoting Rogers v. State, 819 So.2d
643, 662 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001)); People v. Hernandez, 562 N.E.2d 219, 226 (Ill.
App. 2d. 1990) ("In Illinois, only four situations have been recognized as
engendering the type of 'serious provocation' which warrants partial or incomplete
exoneration for the commission of a homicide. They are: (1) substantial physical
injury or assault; (2) mutual quarrel or combat; (3) illegal arrest; and (4) adultery
with the offender's spouse."). See Wayne R. LaFave, 2 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 15.2 (2d
ed. 2012) (noting the "trend away from the usual practice of placing the various
types of provocatory conduct into pigeon-holes"); See Berman & Farrell, supra
note 30, at 1038 (observing that "the categorical approach was replaced by a
standard of reasonableness.").
54. See Berman & Farrell, supra note 30, at 1044 n.64 (observing that
currently nine states, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky,
Montana, New York, North Dakota, and Oregon, adopt the MPC formula in whole
and two, New Hampshire and Utah, adopt it in part).
55. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 45. Cf. Berman & Farrell, supra note
30, at 1039 (noting that "states differ, for example, as to whether mere words or
wrongs done to a third party may amount to adequate provocation, and as to
whether a time delay between the provoking act and the killing. . . precludes the
defense") (footnotes omitted).
56. See, e.g., Provocation Symposium, supra note 31 (articles debating the
nature and optimal formulation of the provocation defense).
57. Joshua Dressler explains:
Today ... provocation law is under attack. Of course, one might expect
law-and-order advocates to criticize a doctrine that can permit an
intentional killer to avoid conviction for murder. . . . Modern criticism of
provocation law is more interesting than that, however. Heat-of-passion
law has been the subject of ethical, and most especially, feminist attack.
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"provocation critics") assert that provocation law adopts and
reinforces masculinist, if not misogynist, views of human
emotion and reaction.58 Even the narrow traditional
provocation defense is subject to the critique that the adultery
category gives license to jealous male killers, and the other
categories privilege violence based on male honor. However,
the broad provocation formulations, particularly the MPC
defense, generate the most disapprobation because they give
the greatest leeway to defendants, including sexist and
homophobic defendants, to argue they were provoked. 59
Today, political positions on provocation have inversely
shifted. Far from heralding defendant-centered formulations as
"enlightened,"60 progressives concerned with race and gender
justice now condemn broad heat-of-passion laws as sexist and
subordinating and call for provocation's abolition or a return to
narrow, prosecution-friendly versions of the defense. 61 This
Part discusses the progressive critique of provocation as
discriminatory against women and LGBT victims and critics'
proposed solutions to the defense's disparity problems. The
first subsection will describe the origin and nature of the
feminist position that provocation law allows state actors and
jurors to treat those who kill gender minorities with undue
leniency. The next subsection will examine the proposed
solution to provocation's problems and reveal how the
proposals, although heterodox in character, nonetheless
uniformly ratchet up punishment.
A. The ProgressiveCritique of Provocation'sGender
Disparities
Beginning in the 1990s, progressive criminal law theorists
We are told that "[v]oluntary manslaughter [heat-of-passion doctrine]
has never been a female-friendly doctrine" and, indeed, "continues to
perpetuate a violent form of male subordination of women."
Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a
Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 960-61 (2002) [hereinafter Difficult
Subject] (quoting, Miller, supra note 12, at 667-78).
58. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 12, at 1386 (asserting that broad provocation
formulas "protect[ ] older gender norms"). See Victim Wrongs, supra note 33, at
680 (noting the feminist critique that provocation law benefits men "whose anger
is informed by patriarchal beliefs").
59. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
61. See infra Part II.B.
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lodged a forceful scholarly attack on the provocation defense. 62
Scholars became aware of many cases in which abusive and
controlling men asserted the provocation defense after killing
female partners who had not engaged in any wrongdoing. 63 In
turn, those concerned with gender equality in criminal law
expressed extreme unease with such defendants utilizing the
provocation defense, similar to the outrage generated by
Zimmerman's use of self-defense. 64 Around the same time,
scholars publicized the relationship between provocation law
and heterosexism and homophobia. 65 The issue gained national
attention with a couple of headline-grabbing cases. The media
extensively covered the 1998 murder of Matthew Shepard,
which later inspired a namesake federal hate crime law. 66 The
defendants tortured and brutally murdered the gay teenage
Shepard and unsuccessfully claimed provocation. 67 Many also
recall the 1995 "Jenny Jones murder," in which -the straight
male defendant killed a man who revealed having a "crush" on
him on a national talk show. He also argued provocation
unsuccessfully at trial.68
The provocation critique is insular in focus, both
philosophically and methodologically. Philosophically, critics
are primarily concerned with individual cases in which women
and LGBT homicide victims are devalued because the
defendant receives, or more often is simply permitted to seek,
lenient treatment under the law. Methodologically, provocation
critics extensively employ the persuasive tool of victimization
62. See articles cited supra note 12.
63. See Coker, supra note 12, at 101-02.
64. See, e.g., Pillsbury, supra note 37, at 166 (discussing provocation
defendants' "patriarchal, jealous rage"); Horder, supra note 37, at 192.
65. See, e.g., Gary David Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic
Defense, 2 LAw & SEXUALITY 81, 86-89 (1992); Mison, supra note 13; see also
Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471 (2008)
[hereinafter Gay Panic]; Scott D. McCoy, Note, The Homosexual-Advance Defense
and Hate Crimes Statutes: Their Interaction and Conflict, 22 CARDozo L. REV.
629 (2001).
66. See Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hates Crimes Prevention Act,
123 Stat. 2835 (2009) (codified as 42 U.S.C.A. § 3716 et seq.).
67. See generally MATTHEWSHEPARD.ORG, http://www.matthewshepard.org/
(website of the Matthew Shepard Foundation); Gay Panic, supra note 65, at 52331 (describing case).
68. See Talk Show Held Negligent in Guest's Killing, CNN.coM (May
7, 1999), http://articles.cnn.com/1999-05-07/entertainment/990507_talk.show.
slaying.03_1 scott-amedure-jonathan-schmitz-amedure-family?-s=PM:SHOWBIZ;
Gay Panic,supra note 65, at 495-97 (describing case).
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narrative to demonstrate that the very existence of such cases
constitutes a grave miscarriage of justice. The literature
critiquing provocation is rife with exacting depictions of cases
in which abusive men commit horrific murders of women, the
women's children and family members, and other third
parties. 6 9 Criminal law scholars have poured through the books
to bring such cases to public light.
In the well-known 1996 article Passion'sProgress,Victoria
Nourse describes several actual cases of men committing brutal
murders when women tried to sever the relationship, 70 upon
jealousy-induced speculation about infidelity, 7 ' and after exes
moved on to new relationships. 7 2 Each vignette ends with the
stark fact that the judge instructed the jury it could apply the
provocation defense. 73 Prolific provocation scholar Cynthia Lee
provides heart-wrenching details of provocation cases like that
of Mark Chicano, whose girlfriend broke up with him and
months later, was living with another man, Raymond:
Mark crept into the bedroom and struck Raymond on the
head with a crowbar. Ellen cried out and tried to protect
Raymond. This only enraged Mark who continued to strike
Raymond with the crowbar until Raymond was lifeless.
Mark then started kicking and punching Ellen.... At this
point, Ellen's eleven-year-old son entered the room and
started screaming. Mark turned to the boy, grabbed him by
the throat to quiet him, and then strangled him to death.
Mark turned back to Ellen and struck her on the head twice
with the crowbar, killing her almost instantly. 74

69. See Nourse, supra note 12, at 1342-43, 1351-52.
70. See id. Nourse quotes extensively from the fact sections of murder cases,
including the case of "Smith" who, after finding out his wife Becky filed for
divorce, "shot through the door [of Becky's family's home], killing Becky's halfsister, then went into the house and killed Becky's mother. Sometime later, as the
ambulance attendants administered to the victims, Smith killed Becky and the
daughter she was holding in her arms." Id. at 1343 (footnote omitted).
71. See id. at 1362-63 (relating such stories).
72. See id. at 1358-59 (relating such stories).
73. See id. at 1342-43, 1351-52, 1358-59, 1362-63 (all stories end with "[t]he
jury was instructed that it could return a verdict of manslaughter based on
'extreme emotional disturbance"' or a very similar statement).
74. REASONABLE MAN, supra note 12, at 38. See also id. at 36-37 (describing
the Hippolito Martinez case, in which married Martinez saw his female paramour
dancing with a man (her brother) and then "struck Esther in the face and shot her
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Similarly, the influential 1992 California Law Review note,
Homophobia in Manslaughter, meticulously depicts cases in
which judges permitted brutal murderers to argue provocation
simply because the decedent was gay.75
Narrative can play a significant role in exposing and
rectifying social injustice by bringing often-obscured facets of
legal and social arrangements into vivid focus. 76 As a technique
of persuasion, storytelling is invaluable, and it is utilized in a
wide-ranging array of legal documents from cases and
legislative enactments to scholarly articles.77 Nevertheless, in
the criminal law context, narrative generally carries a
prosecutorial valence because graphic descriptions of criminal
behavior arouse observers' emotional inclinations to exact
painful punishment without regard to larger issues of equality,
five times" and later "told police, 'I shot her and I hope she dies."'); Susan D.
Rozelle, Controlling Passion:Adultery and the Provocation Defense, 37 RUTGERS
L. J. 197, 201 (2005) (recounting case of Randall Dixon who killed his fiancie for
dancing with another man and stating, "[hie first attacked her at the celebration,
then followed her to her sister's house, where he beat her until she stopped
breathing. He revived her with mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, then took her home
and continued the assault. When the beating stopped at 5:00 a.m., . . . she never
woke up."); CAROLINE FORELL & DONNA MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE

REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN 170 (2000) (quoting facts in a
dissent to a murder reversal, including the coroner's testimony that the deceased
had "many bruises, many violent bruises and injuries to [her] head'".
75. Mison, supra note 13, at 167-70 (describing various cases, including one
in which the "defendant pushed the victim out of the car, chased him, knocked
him down, kicked him, pulled his pants down to hinder pursuit, took his jewelry,
left him lying near the creek in which the body was later found, and drove home
in the victim's car"). See also Gay Panic, supra note 65, at 500-05.
76. See Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionistsand Others: A Plea for
Narrative,87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2413 (1988) ("Stories, parables, chronicles, and
narratives are powerful means for destroying [prevailing] mindset."); Naomi R.
Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in
Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1412 (1992) ("Critical race
theorists believe . . . telling counterstories about the victim's experience may help
to change the dominant culture.") (footnote omitted); Susan Ayres, Incest in a
Thousand Acres: Cheap Trick or Feminist Re-Vision?, 11 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 131,
143 (2001) ("The power of storytelling is especially effective in feminist re-vision
because it provides an alternative discourse for silenced feminine voices and
perspectives."). See generally Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79
CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991) (recounting influential feminist narratives and analyzing
the critique of narrative).
77. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political
Lawyering Practicein Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 876 n.254
(1997) (observing that legal storytelling challenges "dominant legal rules" that
reproduce hierarchy); Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV.
1411, 1435 (1993) ("Individualized stories are essential to avoid the dehumanizing
abstractions that allow people to forget or trivialize the suffering of others.").
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efficiency, or fairness.78 For this reason, detailing true crime
stories is often the province of crime victims' rights reformers
and politicians. 79 Consequently, while narrative can be a tool of
liberation, for those whose liberatory sympathies extend to
marginalized criminal defendants, telling victim stories is, at
best, a double-edged sword.80
Descriptions of horrendous killings prime the reader to
believe the provocation doctrine is patently unjust because it
helps bad defendants (abusers) and treats good victims
(faithful wives trying to leave) as provocateurs. 81 This sets the
stage for another type of evidence-statistical data
demonstrating the prevalence of such unjust outcomes in
jurisdictions with permissive provocation laws. Some of the
evidence is defendant-regarding-for example, Donna Coker's
revelation that a number of men who claim provocation in

78.

See JOSEPH A. AMATO, VICTIMS AND VALUES: A HISTORY AND A THEORY OF

SUFFERING 175 (1990) ("There is an elemental moral requirement to respond to
innocent suffering."); Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative and Victim Impact
Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 412 (1996) ("We ought not to pretend that
storytelling and empathy are value neutral, when in fact they are potent
weapons. . . .").
79. See Nora V. Demleitner, First Peoples, First Principles: The Sentencing
Commission's Obligationto Reject FalseImages of Criminal Offenders, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 563, 568 (2002) (observing that during the war on crime, "[t]he victim became
increasingly pitted against the offender."); MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE
WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS 192 (2002) ("To
maintain its fever pitch of hatred, the war on crime needs ever more, and ever
more sympathetic, victims."). See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. 10,312 (1996) (statement
of Rep. Schumer) (discussing sex offenders' "restless and unrelenting prowl for
children").
80. Narrative is helpful to the progressive agenda when it "challeng[es] one or
more narratives of the majoritarian faith." Richard Delgado, Stark Karst, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1460, 1471 (1995) (reviewing KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE,
LAW'S EXPRESSION (1993)). However, there is good reason to question whether
victimhood stories disrupt rather than support dominant subordinating
ideologies. See supra note 79. Moreover, "[1]istening to individual narratives may
make it more difficult to engage with the larger, systemic, and more fundamental
group problems." Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Lifting the Floor: Sex, Class, and
Education,39 U. BALT. L.F. 57, 69 (2009).
81. See R. NISBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 190 (Prentice-Hall, Inc. ed., 1980)
(asserting that "vivid information ... may have a disproportionate impact on
beliefs and inferences"); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A
Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207,
207-09 (1973) (finding that vivid descriptions are easily recalled and can cause
the listener to overestimate the frequency of the described phenomenon). See
generally Nancy Levit, Confronting Conventional Thinking: The Heuristics
Problem in Feminist Legal Theory, 28 CARDOzO L. REV. 391 (2006).
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intimate homicide cases have histories of domestic violence. 82
Other statistics are victim-regarding, for example, Victoria
Nourse's findings that broad provocation formulas benefit men
who kill women for attempting to separate. 83
Professor Nourse discovered after extensive data analysiS84
that in MPC jurisdictions, provocation claims based at least in
part on women's attempted separation constituted the vast
majority of intimate homicide provocation claims reaching
juries, far surpassing claims involving physical violence.85 This
is compared to "traditional" categorical jurisdictions (namely,
Illinois and Alabama), 86 where victim-violence claims composed
the majority of provocation claims reaching juries and
separation-based claims reached juries least frequently.87
Moreover, in traditional jurisdictions, judges disallowed
provocation claims when the only possible provocative act was
separation, whereas in MPC jurisdictions, pure separation
cases constituted 26 percent of all intimate homicide
provocation claims reaching juries.8 8
Although Nourse provides a fascinating snapshot of how
different provocation formulations might affect the relative
success of male-on-female intimate homicide defendants'
claims, she confines her analysis to this narrow category of
cases. Professor Nourse does not focus more globally on how
broad versus narrow formulations of the heat-of-passion
defense affect defendants' claims across the board.
82. Coker, supra note 12, at 84 (discussing data suggesting that often "the
male killer has a history of violence with the homicide victim"). Cf. Marina Angel,
Criminal Law and Women: Giving the Abused Woman Who Kills a Jury of Her
Peers Who Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229, 319 (1996) ("[T]he
majority of men who kill their female intimates have documented histories of
violent assaults.").
83. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
84. See Nourse, supra note 12, at 1332 n.2 (including every intimate homicide
involving a provocation claim in MPC jurisdictions over a fifteen year period and
"samples" from non-MPC jurisdictions). Nourse does not do standard regression
but intends the data to be illustrative, stating that her argument "could as easily
be made with ten cases as with 200." Id. at 1348 n.97.
85. See id. at 1347 (revealing that 67 percent of MPC provocation claims
reaching juries involved separation whereas only 17 percent involved physical
violence).
86. See id. at 1413.
87. See id. at 1349 (Table B) (revealing that in traditional jurisdictions
physical violence-based provocation claims constituted 68 percent of all claims
reaching juries compared to pure separation claims' 0 percent.).
88. In addition, in MPC jurisdictions, 79 percent of all pure separation claims
reached juries. See id. at 1349, 1356 (charts with percentages).

148

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

Nevertheless, one can glean some other patterns from the data
that are not discussed in the paper. First, it seems that more
overall provocation claims reached juries in MPC jurisdictions
than in traditional jurisdictions. 89 In addition, all grounds for
the provocation defense, not just separation, enjoyed greater
success in MPC jurisdictions. 90 Consequently, the statistical
analysis serves to confirm what one might readily predict at
the outset: moving from a restrictive categorical approach to a
permissive MPC approach allows defendants in intimate
homicide cases to argue provocation based on a wider variety of
victim conduct and permits those arguing provocation, on
whatever ground, to enjoy greater success.
Clearly, however, progressive critics are worried about
gender disparity, not across-the-board leniency. 91 Their concern
is that the provocation defense encourages jurists and jurors to
apply prevailing sexist norms, not that it leads people to
empathize with defendants generally. Of course, it may be that
permissive provocation laws have the greatest impact in cases
where state actors and jurors are already inclined to be lenient
because of sexist cultural norms. 92 If this is so, expansive
89. In MPC jurisdictions ninety-nine out of 133 intimate homicide provocation
claims reached juries (74.43 percent), whereas in traditional jurisdictions only
thirty-eight out of eighty-one such claims reached juries (46.91 percent). Id. at
1349. Despite that adultery is a traditional category, see supra note 35, in MPC
jurisdictions, out of 133 total intimate homicide cases, fifty-three adultery cases
reached the jury, whereas in traditional jurisdictions, out of eighty-one total
intimate homicide cases, only seventeen adultery cases reached the jury. Nourse,
supra note 12, at 1347-49 (Tables A&B). In addition, seven "other" claims reached
juries in MPC jurisdictions, compared to one in traditional jurisdictions. Id. For
the latter two findings, there is not enough data to calculate percentages.
90. Simple infidelity claims enjoyed a 75 percent "success rate" (meaning that
75 percent of all infidelity-based provocation claims reached juries) in MPC
jurisdictions and a 44 percent success rate in traditional jurisdictions. Mixed
separation and infidelity claims enjoyed an 88 percent success rate in MPC
jurisdictions and a 39 percent success rate in traditional jurisdictions. Id. at 1362.
Physical violence claims enjoyed a 77 percent success rate in MPC jurisdictions
and a 60 percent success rate in traditional jurisdictions. Id.
91. There is the contention, arguably unrelated to statistical disparity, that
allowing even one sexist killer to be deemed "reasonable," expresses legal
approval of sexism. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the Study of
Punishment, 56 STAN L. REV. 1171, 1201 (2004) (contending that provocation may
"reinforce[ ] norms that equate male virtue with devotion to patriarchal
conceptions of honor"). Cf. Kahan and Nussbaum, supra note 31, at 360 (asserting
that broad provocation formulations send "a message that fosters and gives
comfort to .. . reprehensible feelings").
92. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What,
and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (2010) (study
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provocation laws likely disproportionately benefit men who kill
women and LGBT people. However, feminist literature does
not contain evidence showing that broad provocation
formulations like the MPC's do not comparably advantage
other homicide defendants. 93 Moreover, there is some evidence
that men who kill female intimates are not culturally
privileged actors 94 and are, in fact, less likely to benefit from
permissive provocation laws than other types of defendants. 95
We will return to the question of which defendants are most
likely to be affected by the provocation defense in Part IV.
Nevertheless, for critical scholars, the problem with
provocation is clear: those who kill socially marginalized
victims or kill in otherwise culturally consonant ways can
utilize the provocation defense, arguably more successfully
than other types of killers.
B. The Upward Ratchet Solution to Provocation's
Disparities
Proposed remedies to provocation's gender problems range
from tinkering with jury instructions 96 to outright abolition. 97
Although remedies vary greatly, they converge on the idea that
lawmakers should reform provocation law to make it more
difficult for particular defendants to avoid murder convictions.

Although the purpose of reform is to address narrow classes of
cases involving sexist and homophobic killers, inevitably, the
implementation of such proposals would make it harder for any

finding that mock jurors' cultural predispositions on gender equality predicted
their verdicts in a date rape case more than the actual formulation of the rape
law).
93. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
94. See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Provoking Change: Comparative Insights on
Feminist Homicide Law Reform, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 33, 45-51 (2010)
(observing that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, cultural
mores dictated that "unmanly" wife killers should receive higher punishment);
Stuart M. Kirschner et al., The Defense of Extreme Emotional Disturbance: A
QualitativeAnalysis of Cases in New York County, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
102, 126 (2004) (finding such defendants to be unsuccessful on their EED claims).
95. See id.
96. See infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., HORDER, supra note 37, at 186-97 (advocating abolition); Miller,
supra note 12, at 692-93; Rozelle, supra note 74, at 233 (advocating abolition
except in cases of imperfect self-defense and defense of others and resisting
unlawful arrest).
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murder defendant to invoke the provocation defense. 98 This is
a consequence critics tend to ignore or accept as necessary (and
even beneficial). 99
There are different methods of remedying formal
inequality produced by discretion. Law reform might act as a
blunt instrument, stamping out the discretion, or it might act
in a managerial manner, trying to coax nondiscriminatory
exercise of discretion. Equality-seeking proposals can also
ratchet up (raise the penalty for sexist and homophobic killers)
or ratchet down (lower the penalties for all other killers).oo To
illustrate, some progressive reformers propose the blunt
ratchet-up reform of abolishing provocation or returning it to
its categorical form.101 Alternatively, progressives could seek to
counter the disparity between privileged (sexist) killers and
other killers by making it exceedingly easy for anyone to claim
provocation so that lenity is widespread and not as determined
by the victim's status (a blunt ratchet-down reform).1 02
Managerial reforms that control discretion through, for
example, prosecutorial guidelines, legal education, and jury
instructions can also ratchet up or down. 103 Jury instructions
could be reconstructed to make it easier to convict sexist killers
of murder, or they could make it harder to convict killers who
fall outside of that class.
The blunt reform favored by many progressive provocation
critics involves restricting the definition of reasonableness.
Having argued that subjective or even juror-defined
reasonableness standards produce unjust individual results,
progressives believe that the answer is to move to a narrower
"normative" conception of reasonableness that allows fewer
defendants to assert that they were reasonably provoked. 104
98. Some proposals are so narrow that they might not have an effect outside
of a small group of cases. See, e.g., Mison, supra note 13, at 177 (urging judges to
"find as a matter of law that a homosexual advance is insufficient provocation").
99. See infra notes 119-20.
100. See REASONABLE MAN, supra note 12, at 277 (observing that "[w]henever
inequities exist in the criminal justice system, one can either ratchet up . . . or
ratchet down").
101. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing abolition of
provocation).
102. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing leveling down).
103. See, e.g., infra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (provocation
proposals).
104. See, Nourse, supra note 12, at 1392-99 (replacing reasonable provocation
with a "warranted excuse"); REASONABLE MAN, supra note 12, at 234-59
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Professor Nourse, for example, would require defendants
claiming provocation to have a "warranted excuse," meaning
society
would
view
the
claim
of
provocation
0
5
"uncontroversially."
Similarly, Professor Lee supports a
"normative" conception of reasonableness 106 focusing not just
on whether "the ordinary person would have felt and acted the
way the defendant did," but also on whether "the defendant
acted the way he should have acted." 107 Thus, in order to
conclude that the defendant was provoked, the jury has to find
not only that the defendant's emotions were that of an
objectively reasonable person but also that his act was one that
an objectively reasonable person should do. These ratchet-up
reforms, requiring pumped-up normative reasonableness,
logically make it more difficult for sexists and homophobes to
defend against murder charges. They also make it harder for
other defendants (men in fights, battered women, bullied kids)
to invoke the provocation defense. 0 8
Yet perhaps if bigoted killers disproportionately benefit
from lenity in provocation law, they would disproportionately
bear the brunt of a punitive legal change. Maybe ratcheting up
could thwart provocation claims from those who kill minority
victims at a higher rate than claims from other murder
defendants, creating equality overall. However, the effects of
legal changes are not generally distributed in such a manner.
More commonly, the favored defendant or defendant who
offends against the disfavored victim will disproportionately
benefit from lenient laws and at the same time be
disproportionately unaffected by punitive laws. 109 Critical legal
(advocating a "normative" conception of reasonableness); Kahan & Nussbaum,
supra note 31, at Part IV (endorsing an "evaluative" formulation in which
defendants' emotional reactions must stem from correct moral appraisals).
105. Nourse, supra note 12, at 1392.
106.

See REASONABLE MAN, supra note 12, at 260-69.

107. Id. at 246. Other proposals leave unchanged the reasonableness standard,
but create other restraints. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 12, at 129-30 (implicitly
endorsing a lack of predisposition requirement); Victim Wrongs, supra note 33, at
712 (explicitly endorsing a lack of predisposition requirement).
108. See REASONABLE MAN, supra note 12, at 273 (noting that proposed
reforms "heighten[] juror scrutiny of all claims of reasonableness, making it more
difficult for defendants claiming they were provoked to receive ... mitigation").
For instance, a lack of the predisposition prong would likely disqualify anyone
with prior convictions. See Victim Wrongs, supra note 33, at 713 (observing that
such defendants "would be afraid to assert the [provocation] defense because of its
potential to make admissible otherwise irrelevant prior crimes evidence").
109. REASONABLE MAN, supra note 12, at 42 (observing that even though
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theorists have long argued that "objective" standards simply
reflect the behaviors of culturally privileged actors. 110 One
should accordingly expect state actors and jurors generally to
view the provocation claims of privileged defendants (i.e., a
white straight man who kills a gay man) as normatively
reasonable and warranted and those of culturally subordinated
defendants (i.e., a black gang member who kills the person
confronting
him) as normatively unreasonable
and
111
controversial.
Of course, ratcheting down would suffer the
same problem, with killers in favored scenarios enjoying the
benefits of broadened discretion more than killers in disfavored
scenarios do. This illustrates the problem that any blunt
reform, whether ratchet-up or ratchet-down, might not remedy
disparity given the multiple other opportunities for discretion
(charging, sentencing, etc.).
There are also various managerial proposals that seek to
guide the exercise of discretion in provocation law. 112 Some
proposals involve adopting a female-centric conception of
reasonableness, such that a defendant (male or female) can
only claim heat-of-passion if a similarly situated woman would
be provoked to kill. 113 A "reasonable woman" standard would
likely increase murder convictions, given society's general view
of women as far more pacifistic than men. 114 Cynthia Lee
suggests a more neutral managerial approach involving
instructing jurors to analyze defendant reasonableness by
"switching" the identities of one or more of the parties to the
criminal event. 115 For example, in a "gay panic" case, the judge
could instruct the jury to decide whether the killing would have

Texas eliminated provocation, non-majority defendants still received
disproportionately lenient treatment during sentencing).
110. See Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 813, 818 (1992) ("Powerful actors ... want objective standards applied to
them simply because these standards always, and already, reflect them and their
culture.").
111. See Alafair S. Burke, Equality, Objectivity, and Neutrality, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 1043, 1066 (2005) (reviewing REASONABLE MAN, supra note 12) ("If a bar is
unlevel, it can be leveled only by adjusting one side more than the other" rather
than simply "rais[ing] the bar entirely, with its original slant intact.").
112. See infra notes 113-121 and accompanying text.
113. See FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 74, at 175-78.
114. See id. at 179-80 (positing that under this standard "claims of intimate
provocation will become a rarity and eventually disappear entirely").
115. REASONABLE MAN, supra note 12, at 252-59 (proposing switching to make
minority status "salient" to jurors).
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been reasonable if the defendant had been gay and the
decedent straight. Unlike many provocation critics, who are
preoccupied primarily with discriminatory mercy, Lee also
problematizes the law's tendency to prevent certain
disempowered defendants, like black men who react violently
to racist statements11 6 and women who kill cheating partners,
from invoking the defense. 117 In any case, when it comes to
wife-killers, switching aids the prosecution because it requires
juries to hold male defendants to female (nonviolent)
standards.11 8
Switching appears to operate most frequently as an
upward ratchet. 119 Moreover, although in theory switching
could help the rare female defendant who kills her cheating
husband by having the jury view her as a (more hotheaded)
man, switching might actually have the opposite effect given
the bias in favor of female defendants. 120 Switching could also
disadvantage certain sympathetic defendants who benefit from
dominant cultural sensibilities. A battered woman claiming
provocation would have a harder time defending if the jury
were asked to decide whether a similarly situated battered
man would have killed his female batterer. Lee accounts for
such defendants by simply exempting them from the switching
paradigm. 121
116. Id. at 58-64.
117. See id. at 51 (observing the "double standard that favors men who kill in
response to female infidelity over women who kill in response to male infidelity").
But see Laurie Ragatz & Brenda Russell, Sex, Sexual Orientation, and Sexism:
What Influence Do These Factors Have on Verdicts in a Crime-of-Passion Case?,
150 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 341, 354-55 (2010) (conducting study and finding that
"violence perpetrated by heterosexual female defendants toward their unfaithful
partner was perceived as more acceptable than violence perpetrated by male or
homosexual defendants.").
118. REASONABLE MAN, supra note 12, at 217-19.
119. See id. at 249 (stating that the problem "is not that jurors are
insufficiently empathetic to defendants" but rather that they are "too likely to
empathize with [privileged] defendant[s]").
120. See Amy Farrell, Geoff Ward & Danielle Rousseau, Intersections of Gender
and Race in Federal Sentencing: Examining Court Contexts and the Effects of
Representative Court Authorities, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 85, 85-86 (2010)
("Decades of research confirm that women receive less-severe sanctions than men
across all phases of the criminal justice system. In fact, leniency toward women
has become an almost accepted phenomenon among scholars studying criminal
case processing.") (footnote omitted).
121. Id. at 219 ("[Glender-switching might not be appropriate in a case
involving a battered woman who kills her abuser during a confrontation."); but see
Burke, supra note 111, at 1073 (advocating switching in battered woman cases "to
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In the end, there are vast differences in progressives'
various proposals to remedy the perceived discrimination
problems of provocation law, but they all have something in
common. The proposals tend to increase the probability and
severity of punishment for those accused of murder. One might
assert that this is just happenstance. Perhaps provocation
critics are concerned with relative rather than absolute
punishment and ratcheting up is the more politically feasible
choice. 122 In other words, these scholars care about equal
treatment of minority killers and other killers, but not about
the ultimate sentence for murder, so punitive proposals are
only preferable because they are more likely to be
implemented. However, critics' form of argumentation,
particularly the extensive use of descriptive narrative, belies
any such agnosticism regarding leniency toward sexist and
homophobic killers.123
More importantly, progressive theorists do and should care
about the ultimate punishment defendants receive. 124
Accordingly, many critics of provocation forthrightly support
ratcheting up as both a retributively palatable reform and a
solution to inequality.125 This position necessarily implicates
two assumptions: (1) the amount of punishment sexist and
homophobic defendants, and all other defendants, will receive
under the reformed system is the just amount; and (2) reform
promotes equality in particular cases without exacerbating
inequality in other areas (or any exacerbation is outweighed).
Provocation theorists have not spent a significant amount of
time discussing either of these issues. Those who propound
provocation reforms tend to concentrate on how legal changes
could affect sexist defendants in a specific set of intimate
homicide cases rather than examining the broader

prevent jurors from applying gendered stereotypes of helplessness and passivity
and to encourage jurors and litigants to focus on the objective circumstances").
122. See, e.g., REASONABLE MAN, supra note 12, at 273.
123. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing the promise and
peril of crime narratives).
124. See, e.g., Gay Panic, supra note 65, at 566 (observing that reforming
provocation might "play a role in mediating th[e] cultural dispute" over
homosexuality).
125. See Nourse, supra note 12, at 1336 (criticizing permissive provocation
laws for denying that men "are acting as moral agents" and making them "play
the role of the helpless female, dependent [and] victimized by inarticulate
impulse").
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consequences of narrowing a murder defense. 126
Why do provocation critics look at these cases in a vacuum
and exempt them from the usual progressive and critical race
skepticism of increased criminalization? Some theorists note
that even in liberal criminal law discourse, critiques of the
American penal state and mass incarceration tend to fade in
the face of truly violent defendant behavior. 127 While the "war
on drugs" and tough prosecutions of "victimless" crimes
constitute favored targets of left-leaning scholars, few are
willing to condemn high sentences for crimes of violence. 128
Murder apparently marks the dividing line where certain
progressives' anxiety over the criminal system's treatment of
marginalized defendants gives way to preoccupation with
marginalized victims' rights to retribution and the expressive
messages sent by lack of harsh punishment. 129
III. DISCRIMINATORY LENIENCY IN

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Provocation critics' prosecutorial stance appears to rest on
the idea that because homicide is an "ultimate act" and killers
generally deserve "ultimate punishments," we should be more
troubled about killers who are under-punished for
discriminatory reasons than with any issue of over-punishment
or the social ills created by punishment.130 By contrast, in the
126. See supraPart II.A.
127. See James Forman Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration:Beyond the
New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 49 (2012) ("Since it is especially difficult to
suspend moral judgment when the discussion turns to violent crime, progressives
tend to avoid or change the subject."). But see, e.g., Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law
in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV. 571 (2011) (unpacking the popular
conception and dialogue of violence and demonstrating how it sustains mass
incarceration).
128. See Ristroph, supra note 127, at 613 (noting that although fear of violence
has fueled the dystopian American penal system, the "call to focus [critically] on
actual physical violence has largely gone unheeded"); Forman, supra note 127, at
48 (criticizing liberal scholars for focusing nearly exclusively on the war on drugs
because "the state's response to violent crime-less diversion and longer
sentences-has been a major cause of mass incarceration").
129. For example, liberals routinely call for elevated punishment of hate
crimes to vindicate the interests of minority victims. See, e.g., Ari Ezra Waldman,
Tormented: Antigay Bullying in School, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 385, 437 (2012) ("[Tlhe
objective gay rights activists hope to achieve through hate crime legislation [is]
sending a message that gay bashing is no different than lynching an African
American man simply because he is black.").
130. See, e.g., REASONABLE MAN, supra note 12, at 277-78 (contending that
ratcheting up "makes particular sense when the defendant has taken another
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death penalty context, progressives are highly skeptical of
dogmatic retributive declarations about killers deserving
ultimate punishments. 131 Liberal scholars similarly emphasize
that death penalty law treats those who kill subordinated
(black) victims more leniently than those who kill privileged
(white) victims but arrive at the opposite conclusion from
provocation
scholars. 132
When
faced
with
racially
discriminatory leniency, death penalty scholars do not propose
to cabin discretion to be lenient; rather, they call for more
widespread leniency.133 This Part looks at the racial disparity
critique of the death penalty and then turns to how
institutional reasoning has led death penalty scholars to use
discriminatory leniency as an argument, not for equalizing
harsh punishment, but for abolishing the harsh punishment
practice.
A. Liberal Critiques of Capital Punishment'sDisparities
Upon hearing that the death, penalty is "racist," many
simply assume that the discrimination consists of black
defendants disproportionally receiving death sentences. 134
However, the primary discrimination regards the race of
victims, not defendants.135 Even so, most people are correct in
connecting the racial argument with the capital punishment

human being's life"). However, violence is not a pre-legal concept, and "we are
presently ill-equipped to disentangle understandable concern for bodily safety
from irrational fear, prejudice, or thoughtless punitiveness." Ristroph, supra note
127, at 575.
131. See, e.g., Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital
Punishment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1677 (1986) ("Those who claim a moral
justification for capital punishment must reconcile that belief with other moral
considerations."); Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism: Panetti and the Futureof
the Eighth Amendment, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1163, 1175 (2009) (contending that
execution "is the 'ultimate' penalty only because some jurisdictions have decided
to actually use the death penalty instead of capping punishment").
132. See infra Parts III.A. and III.B.
133. See infra Part III.B.
134. See Letters to the Editor, Does Race Bias Taint the Death Penalty?, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/opinion/116death.
html?_r=0 (noting that the death penalty disparity "surprisingly, implies that,
nationally, there is death penalty discrimination not against blacks, but against
whites"). Cf. Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. L.J. 375, 419-20
(1994) (noting the shift in the nature of death penalty bias from race-of-defendant
bias to race-of-victim bias).
135. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
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abolitionist position. 136 The racial critique of the death penalty
gained national attention when abolitionist lawyers and social
scientists submitted statistical evidence of racial disparity in
the administration of capital punishment to the Supreme Court
on behalf of the defendant in the 1987 case McCleskey v.
Kemp. 137
Warren McCleskey, an African American, received the
death penalty in Georgia for killing a white police officer
during an armed robbery. 138 McCleskey's attorneys argued to
the Supreme Court that racial discrimination in the application
of capital punishment rendered Georgia's sentencing regime
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 139 To establish the
factual claim of disparity, the defense relied exclusively on data
compiled and analyzed by University of Iowa law professor
David Baldus and his co-authors (collectively, "the Baldus
studies").140 The Baldus studies surprisingly revealed that
white defendants were more likely to get the death penalty
than black defendants. 14 1 It confirmed more predictably that
defendants who killed white victims received capital
punishment more frequently than those who killed black
victims and that black defendants who killed white victims had
the greatest chance of a death sentence. 142 Consequently, the
defense had to package their anti-death penalty arguments in
light of the reality of victim-based discrimination. This was not
exceedingly difficult to do in the Eighth Amendment context.
Prior precedent ruled that "arbitrary and capricious" capital
punishment impositions are unconstitutional, 143 and the

136. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
137. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
138. Id. at 283-84.
139. See generally Brief for Petitioner, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)
(No. 84-6811), 1986 WL 727359 [hereinafter McCleskey Brief].
140. Id. at 7-18. For a discussion on Professor Baldus's legacy, see Symposium,
In Memoriam: David C. Baldus, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1865, 1991 (2012).
141. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286 (noting the "reverse racial disparity").
142. McCleskey Brief, supra note 139, at 11-12 (stating that defendants in
white-victim cases are nearly eleven times more likely to receive a death sentence
than defendants in black-victim cases and 22 percent of black murder defendants
who killed whites were sentenced to death compared to 3 percent of white
defendants who killed blacks).
143. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (stating that capital
procedures must "minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action").
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defense simply contended that death sentences significantly
influenced by victim race are arbitrary and capricious. 144 The
defense highlighted that:
[T]he race of the victim in Georgia exerts as much influence
on the sentence outcome as whether the defendant had a
prior murder conviction. It is more important in
determining life or death than the fact that the defendant
was the prime mover in the homicide, or that he admitted
guilt and asserted no defense. 14 5
However, one might think the fact that the death penalty
disparity was victim-based would hinder the defendant's equal
protection argument. The prototypical discrimination claim
involves a litigant subjected to direct discrimination because of
the litigant's subordinate status. 146 McCleskey, however,
arguably bore the brunt of a discriminatory privilege directed
toward his white victim. The defense phrased much of its equal
protection argument in terms of McCleskey's race, stressing
the finding that "the race of the defendant-especially when
the defendant is black and the victim is white-influences
Georgia's capital sentencing process." 147 The defense also
emphasized the unconstitutionality of discrimination against
African American victims, contending that "[s]ystematically
treating killers of white victims more harshly than killers of
black victims can have no constitutional justification." 4 8
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected both of
McCleskey's claims. The Court disposed of the equal protection
argument on the principle ground that McCleskey had not
demonstrated that his jury or Georgia acted with
discriminatory intent. 14 9 The majority attempted, critics say
with little analytical success, to distinguish McCleskey's

144. McCleskey Brief, supra note 139, at 99-100 (stating that racial influence
"produces, by definition, a pattern of sentencing that is legally 'arbitrary and
capricious"').
145. Id. at 88.
146. See Lee & Bhagwat, supra note 19, at 177 n.97 (1998) (asserting that postMcCleskey, the Supreme Court seems to have endorsed an "individualized
understanding of the equal protection right," in which capital defendants only
have third-party standing to litigate discrimination against victims).
147. McCleskey Brief, supra note 139, at 35-36.
148. Id. at 40.
149. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-99 (1987).
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disparate impact evidence from the type of impact evidence
permitted to prove discriminatory intent in Title VII and jury
venire cases.150 However, when it came to the state's claim that
McCleskey
lacked
standing to challenge
Georgia's
discrimination against black victims not involved in his case,
the Court sided squarely with the defendant. It stated, "It
would violate the Equal Protection Clause for a State to base
enforcement of its criminal laws on an unjustifiable standard
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Because
McCleskey raises such a claim, he has standing."' 5 ' The Court
seemed to be saying that a defendant may properly point to
discriminatory mercy in unrelated minority-victim cases to
argue for similar lenient treatment in his white-victim case. 152
Any implication that increased leniency can remedy
discriminatory discretion ends with that statement. The Court
rejected McCleskey's Eighth Amendment criticism of
discriminatory discretion by referring to, of all things,
defendants' interests. 153 Emphasizing discretion's "substantial
benefits" to defendants, 154 the Court declared that "a capital
punishment system that did not allow for discretionary acts of
leniency would be totally alien to our notions of criminal
justice." 55 The Court set up a dichotomy in which the state can
either fix racial disparity by eliminating discretionary leniency
(for example, reverting to the mandatory death penalty) or
preserve the possibility of lenity with its concurrent risk of
racial discrimination. In essence, the majority, like provocation
critics, portrayed defendant-unfriendly ratcheting up as the
sole solution to the problem of undervalued minority victims. 156
150. Id. at 294-95. The Court moreover denied that Georgia's deliberate
maintenance of a racially disproportionate capital punishment system evidenced
intentional racial animus. Id. at 297-99.
151. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291 n.8 (citation omitted).
152. See David C. Baldus et al., Race and ProportionalitySince McCleskey v.
Kemp (1987): Different Actors with Mixed Strategies of Denial and Avoidance, 39
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 143, 144 (2007) [hereinafter Race and Proportionality]
("McCleskey handed claimants in the federal courts a procedural victory, i.e.,
standing to bring race-of-victim claims."). However, in other passages, the
majority indicates the exact opposite, stating, "McCleskey cannot prove a
constitutional violation by demonstrating that other defendants who may be
similarly situated did not receive the death penalty." Id. at 306-07.
153. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312.
154. Id. at 311.
155. Id. at 312 (internal citations omitted).
156. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The
Paradoxof Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory CapitalPunishment Scheme, 6 WM.
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The Court simply ignored the possibility that the system could
"value" black victims by ratcheting down the punishment for
white-victim killings. 157
Since McCleskey, scholars have engaged in multiple
replication studies and new studies of disparities in death
penalty application. 158 Expert opinion on the nature of capital
punishment discrimination is quite uniform: the problem is
that a death sentence is far more likely in cases involving white
victims than in cases involving minority victims. 159 A few
studies note a defendant race-based disparity, and several
confirm the evidence presented by McCleskey that the
combination of black defendant and white victim produces
death penalty verdicts more than any other defendant-victim
combination. 160 However, studies have not consistently
confirmed a defendant-based bias and the question of whether
there is such a disparity appears to remain open. 16 1

& MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 389 (1998) ("[T]he Court in McCleskey focused on the
fact that the discrepancy in sentencing resulted from discretionary leniency.").
157. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If society were
indeed forced to choose between a racially discriminatory death penalty (one that
provides heightened protection against murder 'for whites only') and no death
penalty at all, the choice mandated by the Constitution would be plain.").
158. See studies cited infra note 159.
159. See Robinson, supra note 21, at 3 (surveying death penalty "experts,"
finding that 84 percent believed it was racially biased and that "the racial bias in
capital punishment does not pertain to race of defendant but rather to race of
victim"). See, e.g., Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Death
Sentencing in North Carolina, 1980-2007, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2119, 2145 (2011)
(conducting twenty-eight year study and concluding that victim race "is a strong
predictor of who is sentenced to death in North Carolina"); Samuel R. Gross &
Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital
Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN L. REV. 27, 105 (1984)
(conducting study of eight states' capital systems and finding that race-of-victim
discrimination "is a remarkably stable and consistent phenomenon"); Isaac Unah,
Choosing Those Who Will Die: The Effect of Race, Gender, and Law in
Prosecutorial Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in Durham County, North
Carolina,15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 135, 177 (2009) (conducting study and concluding
that "[d]efendants of whatever race who kill White victims are significantly worse
off than defendants who kill Black victims").
160. See, e.g., David C. Baldus, et al., Evidence of Racial Discriminationin the
Use of the Death Penalty: A Story From Southwest Arkansas (1990-2003) with
Special Reference to the Case of Death Row Inmate Frank Williams, Jr., 76 TENN.
L. REV. 555, 571-72 (2009) (finding the combination of black defendant and white
victim to be significant).
161. See, e.g., Radelet & Pierce, supra note 159, at 2135 (discussing studies
indicating that "the race of the victim, and not the race of the defendant, was the
principal non-legal factor associated with contemporary death sentencing"); U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING

OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-57,

DEATH PENALTY

SENTENCING:
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Because abolitionists by and large gather and analyze the
empirical data, the victim-based disparity is described in
nefarious terms. Scholars have identified the primary problem
as conscious and unconscious biases causing the devaluation of
black victims. 162 Many have asserted that society harbors
racialized perceptions of harm, such that state actors and
jurors see white victims as suffering more than black victims
do. 163 Some studies demonstrate same-race bias, 164 and others
find that biases against black victims transcend juror race. 165
Scholars highlight evidence that attribution of blame is
similarly racialized.166 In addition to tracing the death penalty
RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5-6 (1990) (synthesizing

twenty-eight death penalty studies and concluding that "the race of victim
influence was found at all stages of the criminal justice system process" but
"evidence for the influence of the race of defendant on death penalty outcomes was
equivocal"), availableat http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/212180.pdf.
162. See Gross & Mauro, supra note 159, at 107 (observing that "it has been
argued that our society tends to view blacks as 'devalued crime victims'); Charles
J. Ogletree, Jr., Black Man's Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in America, 81
OR. L. REV. 15, 32 (2002) (contending disparity shows that "[w]hite lives are
considered to be more valuable than black lives").
163. See, e.g., DAVID R. KARP & JARRETT B. WARSHAW, WOUNDS THAT Do NOT
BIND: VICTIM-BASED PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEATH PENALTY, 287-88 (James R.
Acker & David R. Karp eds., 2006) (study reporting that jurors paid more
attention to the suffering of white victims' families than to those of nonwhite
victims).
164. See, e.g., Robert J. Smith & Bidish J. Sarma, How and Why Race
Continues to Influence the Administrationof Criminal Justice in Louisiana, 72 LA.
L. REV. 361, 402-03 (2012) (asserting that "ingroup bias" may make white jurors
sympathize more with white victims); BRYAN C. EDELMAN, RACIAL PREJUDICE,
JUROR EMPATHY, AND SENTENCING IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 21-37 (2006) (study
finding that white jurors in death cases were more empathetic to white victims);
Douglas 0. Linder, Juror Empathy and Race, 63 TENN. L. REV. 887, 909 (1996)
(connecting white juror/white victim empathy to race-of-victim disparities).
165. See Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and the
Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 88 N.C. L.
REV. 2031, 2105 (2010) (observing that discrimination may result from all jurors
sympathizing more with white victims); David C. Baldus et al., The Use of
Peremptory Challenges in CapitalMurder Trials:A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis,
3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3 (2001) (study finding that even with five or more black
jurors, mock juries were more likely to sentence black defendants to death, but
that disparity decreased with increasing number of black jurors). Cf. Stephen B.
Bright, Discrimination,Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination
in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 455 (1995) (noting
that "minority jurors may have reservations about the death penalty").
166. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructinga Criminal Justice System Free
of Racial Bias: An Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 282
(2007) ("Studies show that jurors are less empathetic toward black defendants");
Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the
Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 82 (1993) (noting
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disparity to racist and racialist attitudes, experts have
connected the disparity to other conditions of inequality
correlated to race, such as the inability of economically and
socially marginalized victims' families to insist on adequate
the woeful representation afforded
police investigation1 67 and
68
defendants.1
to indigent
Jurors and judges are prime targets of criticism, but
prosecutors tend to draw the majority of scrutiny and
condemnation. Many experts explain victim-based bias nearly
exclusively with reference to prosecutorial discretion. 169 They
maintain that prosecutors are overtly discriminatory, or at
least exhibit the same internal biases as jurors.170 Others note
that prosecutors' seemingly neutral determinations about
winnable death cases at worst are racist and at best reflect and
reinforce existing inequalities.171 Finally, scholars publicize
that death penalty prosecutors are overwhelmingly white and
hypothesize that greater prosecutorial diversity might reduce
disparity.172
that "a significant number of studies" find that white jurors are more likely than
black jurors to convict black defendants).
167. See Unah, supra note 159, at 157 (noting that "more information is
usually gathered about the crime and its aggravating circumstances in Whitevictim cases").
168. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for
the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1843-44 (1994);
Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth
Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 433 (1993).
169. See Katherine Barnes et al., Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of
ProsecutorialDecision-Makingin Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 305, 360
(2009); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor'sPerspective: Race of
the DiscretionaryActors, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1811, 1815, 1819-20 (1998); Unah,
supra note 159, at 177; Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution:
Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 644 n.120 (1998);
Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey:
The Role of ProsecutorialDiscretion,41 RUTGERS L. REV. 27, 327 (1988).
170. See Theodore Eisenberg, Death Sentence Rates and County Demographics:
An EmpiricalStudy, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 347, 348 (2005) (observing popularity of
the argument that "prosecutors devalue black victims' lives and do not regard
black-victim murders as seriously as white-victim murders").
171. See Gross & Mauro, supra note 159, at 107 (noting the argument that
prosecutors pursue the death penalty in "homicides that are visible and
disturbing to the majority of the community, and these will tend to be whitevictim homicides").
172. See, e.g., Pokorak, supra note 169, at 1817 (finding that capital
prosecutors "are almost entirely white" and suggesting that unconscious bias may
influence their decisions); Jules Epstein, Death-Worthiness and Prosecutorial
Discretion in Capital Case Charging, 19 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 389, 410
(2010) (linking disparity to prosecutor race and citing 1998 study indicating that
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Abolitionists characterize the failure to impose death in
black-victim cases as a devaluation of African American
victims or other manifestation of racial animus in order to
underscore the unjust nature of the entire death penalty
enterprise. 173 Consequently, studies finding that leniency in
black-victim cases increases with the number of black jurors, 174
or arguments that link mercy in black-victim cases with
African American opposition to the death penalty, receive
minimal attention.175 However, casting leniency in black-victim
cases as a devaluation or dehumanization of black victims puts
abolitionists in a strange position because it implies that the
valuing or humanizing move is to impose the death penalty.176
Nevertheless, liberal legal scholars have always used the racial

"97.5%of the chief prosecutors were white and only 1.2% were black").
173. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
174. See Eisenberg, supra note 170, at 370 (conducting empirical study and
concluding that "[t]he death sentence rate in black defendant-black victim
homicides decreases as the black population percent increases" suggesting that
"minority community skepticism about the justness of the death penalty"
contributes to disparity). Interestingly, at the time this Article was written, this
2005 Cornell Law Review article authored by a leading legal empiricist was cited
only three times on Westlaw. One article cited it for the proposition that death
eligible cases are expensive. David McCord, Lightning Still Strikes: Evidence from
the Popular Press That Death Sentencing Continues to be Unconstitutionally
Arbitrary More Than Three Decades After Furman, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 797, 858
n.189 (2005). The second cited it to show that white jurors are more likely to
convict African Americans. Wendy Parker, Juries, Race, and Gender: A Story of
Today's Inequality, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 209, 235 n.193 (2011). The third
cited it for the proposition that empirical legal scholarship "spur[s] debate." Mary
De Ming Fan, Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril Amid the Promise of
Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 3 n.3 (2007).
175. See Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 26, 46-47 (2000) (citing studies and concluding that "black juror[s]
[are] more likely to have found the defendant likable as a person no matter what
the race of the victim or the defendant" or the circumstances of the crime)
(citations omitted).
176. For example, it is surprising when Evan Lee and Ashutosh Bhagwat
follow the observation that black-victim bias imposes "important harms" by
denying black victims' families "the sense of closure and 'justice' that the death
penalty affords," with a proposal to remedy the "overvaluation" of white victims
through commutation and the "undervaluation" of black victims through money
damages. Lee & Bhagwat, supra note 19, at 149, 161-70. Similarly, one could
hardly predict an abolitionist conclusion from feminist theorist Martha
Chamallas's statement that when failure to impose death causes "emotional
harm" to "the family and friends of the undervalued black victim" and "reinforces
a cultural belief in the inferiority of blacks and generally contributes to the
maintenance of white supremacy." The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in
Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 473 (1998).
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argument as an anti-death penalty argument.177 The next
subsection discusses the consensus among death penalty
scholars that the solution to the problem of discriminatory
leniency in capital punishment is abolition.
B. The Downward Ratchet Solution to Capital
Punishment'sDisparities
On a balmy Halloween afternoon in South Los Angeles in
2010, five-year-old Aaron Shannon Jr. proudly walked out into
the family yard, sporting his new Spiderman costume. 178 He
was excited to show the costume to his grandfather, who in
turn, like any proud grandparent, was overjoyed to snap a
picture of his adorable grandchild. Aaron dressed up to go with
his family to an annual Halloween party in the neighborhood.
As Aaron's grandfather happily shot pictures, two shooters of a
different kind stealthily approached the alley behind Aaron's
residence. Shots rang out, and a terrified Aaron dashed away.
A bullet pierced five-year-old Aaron's skull as he ran for his
life. He later died. Aaron's uncle and grandfather were also
shot but ultimately survived. The police later arrested Leonard
Hall and Marcus Denson, members of the violent street gang,
the Kitchen Crips, for the shootings. Rather than charging
Denson and Hall with capital murder for the senseless and
wanton slaying of young Aaron, a charge readily available in
California, L.A. prosecutors merely charged the killers with
using a firearm resulting in death, a noncapital offense.
Despite the horrific nature of the crime, the District Attorney
decided to exercise moderation. Then again, Aaron was African
American and from the inner city.
The above narrative, a true story relayed in a manner
similar to progressive provocation narratives, 179 illustrates in
stark terms the claim that discretion in death penalty law
leads institutional actors to exercise undue tolerance toward
177. See infra notes 187-97 and accompanying text.
178. I constructed this narrative from the following news report: Boy Shot to
Death on Halloween Wearing his Spiderman Costume, KTLA.COM (last visited
Dec. 31, 2012) [hereinafter Boy Shot], http://www.ktla.comlnews/landing/ktlasouth-la-boy-shot,0,567065.story; see also Richard Winton, Aaron Shanno Jr., 5,
LATIMES.COM (last visited Aug. 24, 2013), http://projects.latimes.com/homicide/
post/aaron-shannon-jr/.
179. See sources cited supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text (discussing
provocation narratives).
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minority killers. 80 However, one is unlikely to ever hear this
type of narrative from scholars who write about race and the
death penalty. This is because the story primes the reader to
support the death penalty for the identified killers.181 Indeed,
the facts of the narrative come from a story appearing on
KTLA.com (a local Los Angeles news channel's website),1 82
which prompted online comments including: "We need an
EXECUTION PENALTY!"; "Death penalty should be issued for
the responsible person(s)"; and "They should be shot in the
head."l 83 This is hardly the reaction sought by those using
racial arguments to support abolition.
Instead, experts who complain of a racialized death
penalty tend to describe cases in a light sympathetic to black
defendants sentenced to capital punishment for killing white
victims. Stories focus on humanizing the defendant or exposing
the procedural deficiencies in the death penalty process.184
More often, progressives forego storytelling and set forth the
racial disparity argument in a scientific or legalistic manner as
an antecedent to the conclusion that the death penalty is
racially, socially, and morally problematic.185 Some make the
hedged claim that because it is so difficult to eradicate bias, we
180. See sources cited supra note 162 (characterizing the phenomenon as
devaluation).
181. See sources cited supra note 81 (discussing narrative and priming).
182. Boy Shot, supra note 178.
183. Discussion, Boy Shot to Death on Halloween Wearing His Spiderman
Costume, KTLA.COM, http://discussions.ktla.com/20/ktla2/ktla-south-la-boy-shot/
10.
184. For example, abolitionist Sherri Lynn Johnson sympathetically recounts
the cases of capital convicts Tommie Smith and Ronnie Howard. Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Respectability, Race Neutrality, and Truth, 107 YALE L.J. 2619, 2649-59
(1998). Of now-executed Smith's case, she states, "[iut was undisputed that
plainclothes Indianapolis police officers burst into Tommie Smith's home before
dawn and that Tommie Smith shot and killed one of them. The police officers shot
Smith, wounding him so severely that he was unconscious by the time they
reached him." Id. at 2649. Regarding Howard, Johnson passionately remarks,
"Ronnie Howard may not be 'respectable' in the eyes of many white Americans,
but ... he is capable of shame, selflessness, courage, warmth, humanity, and
decency, and I am blessed to know him." Id. at 2657-58. See also, e.g., Stephen B.
Bright, The Death Penalty and the Society We Want, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 369, 377-78
(2008) (telling the story of "Exzavious Gibson, a man sentenced to death in
Georgia whose IQ was found on different tests to be between seventy-six and
eighty-two, [who] stood, totally bewildered, in front of a judge at his first state
post-conviction hearing in Georgia without a lawyer" and whose judge "denied
relief by signing a twenty-two-page order prepared by the assistant attorney
general without changing even a comma.").
185. See, e.g., studies discussed in supra notes 158-72 and accompanying text.
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should at the very least make sure the ultimate punishment
cannot be assessed in a discriminatory manner. 186 However,
even while proposing ways to level death penalty impositions,
liberal scholars openly express preference for death penalty
abolition all together. 187
Experts are in fair agreement that the current death
penalty regimes' discretionary nature creates the problem.188
Death penalty discretion is twofold: First, statutory
aggravating factors are broad and numerous, and are getting
more so every year, making it easy to pursue the death penalty
in any given murder case. 189 Second, mitigating factors are
unlimited, giving leeway to prosecutors and jurors to decline
the death penalty in any given murder case. 190 Both factors
arguably contribute to racial disparities, but the first, the
upward ratchet, receives the bulk of criticism in death penalty
scholarship. 19 1 The discretion inherent in the law of mitigating
factors, the downward ratchet, tends to resist progressive
critique. 192
186. See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, Furman's Mythical Mandate, 40 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 435, 472-73 (2007) (inviting the Court to "sensibly" limit capital
punishment "based on statistical evidence of racial discrimination"); Tabak, supra
note 25, at 1445; Singleton v. Norris, 108 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 1997) (Heaney,
J., concurring) (rejecting death penalty on ground that it cannot "ever be
administered in a rational and consistent manner").
187. See, e.g., David McCord, Should Commission of a ContemporaneousArson,
Burglary, Kidnapping, Rape, or Robbery Be Sufficient to Make a Murderer
Eligiblefor a Death Sentence? - An Empirical and Normative Analysis, 49 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (calling proposals to level capital punishment "far
inferior to eliminating the death penalty entirely"). See also infra notes 193-197
and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Mukul Bakhshi, New Frameworks for Racial
Equality in the Criminal Law, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2007) ("The
racial skew in death verdicts reflects . . . the systematic application of discretion
freed from constitutional regulation and oversight.").
189. See William W. Berry III, PracticingProportionality,64 FLA. L. REV. 687,
702-06 (2012).
190. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 471-72 (1993).
191. See, e.g., Berry, supra note 189, at 700 (attributing disparities to the
inadequacy of aggravating factors and appellate review); Chelsea Creo Sharon,
Note, The "Most Deserving" of Death: The Narrowing Requirement and the
Proliferationof Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223, 234 (2011) (criticizing capital sentencing statutes' lists of
aggravators for their "extraordinary breadth"); Race and Proportionality,supra
note 152, at 175 (linking racial disparity to broad statutory aggravators).
192. See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sentencing
Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 323 (1992)
(asserting that retributive justice requires delimited, individualized mitigation
evidence and if such inexorably creates racial disparity, capital punishment
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Death penalty literature is replete with other examples of
experts' exceeding reluctance to remedy the death penalty's
widespread capital
disparity problems through more
punishment imposition. An especially striking example of the
abolitionist construction of the racial argument comes from a
recent paper in the Charleston Law Review setting forth a
racial critique of South Carolina's capital punishment
regime.193 One section of the article concentrates on overtly
bigoted statements made by white death penalty prosecutors
about black defendants and victims. 194 It provides a
"particularly instructive" illustration of prosecutorial racism
that consists of the following statement by a death penalty
prosecutor to the defense attorney after direct appeal:
I felt like the black community would be upset though if we
did not seek the death penalty because there were two black
victims in this case. . . . The only mention that was ever
made of race was when I said that I felt like if we did not
seek the death penalty, that the community, the black

should be abolished); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 716 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "the size of the [death-eligible] class may be narrowed to
reduce sufficiently that risk of arbitrariness, even if a jury is then given complete
discretion to show mercy when evaluating [their] individual characteristics"),
vacated, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 484 (2002); but see Carol S. Steiker & Jordan
M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional
Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 392 (1995) ("[T]he
Court's insistence that the individualization requirement encompasses all
conceivably mitigating evidence undermines its effort to achieve equality in the
administration of the death penalty."). The critique of unlimited mitigation
evidence usually comes from tough-on-crime conservatives. See, e.g., Graham v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 495 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotations
omitted) (denying that "the Eighth Amendment necessarily requires that that
discretion be unguided and unlimited with respect to the class of murderers
subject to capital punishment"). One might rejoin that the divergence is more a
function of the different legal nature of aggravation and mitigation evidence than
political predisposition. See Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided
Discretion in the Supreme Court's Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1151, 1193 (2003) (asserting that "the asymmetrical nature of the
sentencing inquiry manifests the time-honored judgment that punishing the
innocent is a graver injustice than acquitting the guilty"); Martha C. Nussbaum,
Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUBi. AFF. 83, 118 (1993) ("[T]he functions of
aggravation-criteria and of mitigation are not parallel: aggravation serves to place
the offense in the class to which mitigation is relevant.").
193. John H. Blume et al., When Lightning Strikes Back: South Carolina's
Return to the Unconstitutional, Standardless Capital Sentencing Regime of the
Pre-FurmanEra, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 479, 506-08 (2010).
194. Id. at 514-16.
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community would be upset because we are seeking the
death penalty in the (Andre) Rosemond case for the murder
of two white people. 195
This statement became the ground for the defendant's
successful appeal on the basis of intentional discrimination, a
result applauded by the article's authors.196 However, the kind
of ameliorative racial consciousness exhibited by the
prosecutor, it seems, would be precisely the attitude that one
might imagine could level the death penalty playing field and
temper the "devaluation" of black murder victims. 197
Nevertheless, when filtered through an abolitionist lens, the
statement is just further evidence that the entire institution of
the death penalty is racist and should be eliminated.
A few commentators, notably Harvard law professor
Randall Kennedy, have endorsed upward ratchet solutions to
the problem of death penalty disparity. 19 8 Kennedy, like
abolitionists, characterizes victim-based disparity as a
distinctly negative phenomenon, reflecting that "in Georgia's

marketplace of emotion the lives of blacks simply count for less
than the lives of whites."1 9 9 He endorses race-conscious
prosecution, a "level-up" remedy, even though it could result in
some killers of black victims (who may be black) 20 0 receiving
the death penalty for racial reasons. 20 1 Although Professor
Kennedy recognizes that abolition could "address the problem

195. Id. at 515-16 (citing State v. Kelly, No. 99-CP-42-1174, at 38 (S.C. Ct.
C.P. Oct. 6, 2003) (order granting relief)).
196. Id. at 516.
197. See Linder, supra note 164, at 910 (exhorting prosecutors to "understand
the importance of reminding jurors . . . that the lives of black victims are as
valuable as lives of white victims" and suggesting that prosecutors "use closing
arguments to tell the stories of black victims in such a way as to emphasize points
of commonality with white jurors"). See also infra note 200 and accompanying text
(discussing race-conscious prosecution).
198. See Kennedy, supra note 17. See also Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. at 495
(Thomas, J., concurring).
199. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 1441 (emphasis in original).
200. Killing is largely an intraracial phenomenon. See ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA
L. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOMICIDE
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980-2008, NCJ 236018, 13 (2011), available at
http:/Ibjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdflhtus8008.pdf (finding that between 1980
and 2008, 84 percent of white victims were killed by whites and 93 percent of
black victims were killed by blacks).
201. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 1438 (analogizing such costs to affirmative
action's costs to white job-seekers).
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of inequality by leveling downwards the provision of death
penalty services," he does not ultimately favor it.202 Describing
the death penalty institutionally as "a useful and highly valued
public good," 203 he opines that "abolition as a remedy for raceof-the-victim disparities is equivalent to reducing to darkness a
town in which street lights have been provided on a racially
unequal basis."204 If the electric chair carries a similar public
value to electric lights, then it makes sense to reduce disparity
through flipping the switch on more, not less, often.
The abolitionist replies to Kennedy's ratchet-up ideas
underscore the institutional nature of the capital punishment
debate. Some, like Charles Ogletree, detail the death penalty's
sordid racial history, including state-sanctioned lynchings, and
opine that "[r]ather than executing more people, we could
execute fewer." 205 Others, like David Cole, point out the
deleterious effects increased criminalization has on
marginalized groups, especially black neighborhoods, and
conclude that Kennedy's analysis "fails because law
enforcement is neither the only nor the most promising 'public
good' whose redistribution ought to be considered."206 Critics
similarly assert that racial ratchet-up proposals falsely assume
that law-abiding citizens' welfare is inexorably opposed to
defendants' welfare. 207 Kim Taylor-Thompson states, "Rather
than drawing lines that cast out offenders, communities of
color often conceive of their collective future as one that is
linked to the fates of their individual members, including
lawbreakers." 208 Finally, scholars respond to Kennedy's
disparity analysis by reiterating an a priori moral opposition to
the death penalty. 209
Bringing an institutional lens to the question of whether to
alleviate discrimination in criminal law through more or less
202. Id. at 1439.
203. Id. at 1440.
204. Id.
205. See Ogletree, supra note 162, at 33.
206. David Cole, Essay, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on
Randall Kennedy's "Politicsof Distinction",83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2570 (1995).
207. See, e.g., Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a
Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1772-73 (1992); Kim TaylorThompson, The Politics of Common Ground, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1306, 1309 (1998).
208. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 207, at 1310.
209. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 184, at 2659 (concluding a censorious review
of Kennedy's position by stating, "Compassion in the end is wisdom. Any man's
death diminishes me").
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punishment is neither illegitimate nor mere politics. Evan Lee
and Ashutosh Bhagwat remark that "without some normative
baseline, the choice between [ratchet-up and ratchet-down]
remedies is arbitrary."210 Differing baseline commitments
explain the divergence between retentionists who see capital
punishment's problem as underpunishment of minority-victim
killers 211 and abolitionists who see the problem as
overpunishment of white-victim killers. 2 12 That is not to say
that all institutional reasons are of equal merit. Debates
continue over whether the death penalty deters or produces
violence, whether it is morally reprehensible or morally
required, whether it is a badge of sovereignty or a violation of
universal norms, and whether it helps or hurts marginalized
communities. 213 The point is that scholars' analyses of capital
punishment's disparities openly take place in the context of
these existing debates. The next section examines how similar
institutional considerations might shape the debate over
provocation's disparities.
IV. THE INSTITUTION OF NON-CAPITAL MURDER LAW
When racial and gender minorities suffer horrific attacks
because of their status, the typical reaction is to call on the
state to treat the offenders as harshly as, or even more harshly
than, those who offend against majority victims. 214 However,
this position is in ways at odds with the progressive stance, and
indeed the general view of criminal law academics, that the
United States penal system is overly authoritarian, highly
discriminatory, and even sadistic. 215 This Part first examines
the reasons why provocation critics generally do not look at the
institutional aspects of murder law when formulating their
proposals. Next, it provides a sketch of murder law in the
United States and extends an invitation to others to gather
210. Lee & Bhagwat, supra note 19, at 162.
211. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 162, at 33 (stating that a remedy might be
"ceasing to over-value white life so much"); supra notes 187-97 and accompanying
text.
213. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
214. See supra Part II.A.
215. See, e.g., infra notes 216-22 and accompanying text (critiques of the U.S.
criminal system); see Ristroph, supra note 127, at 610 ("The American criminal
justice system is the pride of no one.").
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more evidence about the provocation defense's intervention in
the institution of murder law.
A. InsularProvocationAnalysis
Today, the liberal critique of mass incarceration and the
American penal state, an institutional critique, is well-trodden
academic territory. 2 16 Some object on human rights grounds
that the United States is an outlier among industrialized
countries in its punitiveness. 217 Others connect the ideology of
crime control to a neoliberal political philosophy that is
inherently inhospitable to marginalized members of society. 218
Critical race theorists have demonstrated how the growing
carceral state has harmed communities of color and other
subordinated groups. 219 Mass incarceration famously has been

216. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); PAUL BUTL9R, LET'S GET
FREE: A HIP-Hop THEORY OF JUSTICE 40-61 (2008) (problematizing mass

incarceration); infra notes 218-22; see also Andrew Taslitz, The Criminal
Republic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of Mass Incarceration,9 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 133, 133 (2011) (observing that "mass incarceration" describes the
"explosion of Americans' reliance on imprisonment"). Cf. David Cole, Mass
Incarceration: Causes, Consequences, and Exit Strategies. Turning the Corner on
Mass incarceration,9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 50 (2011) (calling critiques of mass
incarceration "old news").
217. See Marie Gottschalk, The Long Reach of the CarceralState: The Politics
of Crime, Mass Imprisonment, and Penal Reform in the United States and Abroad,
34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 439, 450-51 (2009) (noting that "human rights
organizations . .. have been drawing increased national and international
attention to how US penal practices are way out of line with those of other
Western countries.").
218. See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS:
PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 202-03 (2011) (asserting that
the American penal state has "been facilitated by . . . the rationality of neoliberal
penality: by, on the one hand, the assumption of government legitimacy and
competence in the penal arena and, on the other hand, the presumption that the
government should not play a role elsewhere"); LOIC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE
POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY 297 (2009) ("The
widening of the penal dragnet under neoliberalism has been remarkably
discriminating: . . . it has affected essentially the denizens of the lower regions of
social and physical space.").
219. See, e.g., Jacqueline Johnson, Mass Incarceration: A Contemporary
Mechanism of Racialization in the United States, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 301, 302-04
(2012); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarcerationin
African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1298-99 (2004); Ian F.
Haney Lopez, Essay, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass
Incarcerationin the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1047 (2010).
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called "the new Jim Crow," 220 and some see it as akin to
modern day slavery. Loic Wacquant puts it eloquently: "Just as
bondage effected the 'social death' of imported African captives
and their descendants on American soil by tearing them apart
from all recognized social relations, mass incarceration also
induces the civic death of those it ensnares by extruding them
from the social compact, thereby making them civiliter
mortui."221 Scholars have causally linked crime control reform
and discourse in the United States with economic harm, social
deterioration, and even the obesity epidemic. 222
Progressive provocation scholars, by contrast, eschew
global concerns over punishment in favor of an insular focus on
individual cases of violent victimization. Such a focus tends to
normalize, moralize, and even compel state punitive violence as
the ethical and required response to individual private
violence. 223 Centralizing victims' interests allows critics to
exempt out concerns over the penal state. As the death penalty
debate demonstrates, however, characterizing disparity as a
matter of under-punishment is really a discursive and tactical
choice. 224 Provocation scholars, like death penalty theorists,
could characterize murder convictions in non-minority victim
cases as over-punishment and argue for greater lenity all
around. Granted, this may not be the most politically palatable
position, but it is the only position that simultaneously
addresses inequality and the harms of punishment. 225
220. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 216. See also Forman, supra note 127.
221. Loic Wacquant, Race as Civic Felony, 57 INT'L SOC. SCI. J. 127, 128 (2005)
(internal citations omitted).
222. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and
Social Control: The Paradoxof Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 173, 228 (2008) (citing multiple studies demonstrating that U.S.
criminal justice tears apart minority communities, disrupts informal social
controls, and ultimately has a "perverse escalatory effect[ ]"); Jonathan Simon,
Introduction: Crime, Community, and Criminal Justice, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1415,
1417 (2002) (linking increased securitization to "sprawl, traffic congestion,
desertion of public spaces and institutions, and a national epidemic in childhood
obesity"); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Murder, Meth, Mammon, and Moral Values: The
Political Landscape of American Sentencing Reform, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 495, 505
(2005) ("Mhe human and economic costs of the American experiment in mass
incarceration have been high.").
223. See supra note 79; Ristroph, supra note 127, at 611 (contending that "the
perceived threat of violence legitimates the criminal justice system").
224. See supra notes 78-80, 124 and accompanying text.
225. Progressive discourse on criminal law is often at odds with popular procriminalization sentiments. See supra note 79 (discussing victims' rights
discourse).
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Provocation critics might respond that it is completely
proper, and indeed typical in criminal scholarship, to
concentrate on the apportionment of criminal liability without
taking up issues of punishment and its societal effects. 226
Although as a matter of formalistic penal theory it might be
possible to divorce fault from sentencing, for many criminal law
scholars, especially for critical theorists from a legal realist
background, it is a distinction without a difference. 227 Death
penalty analysis exposes that questions of liability and
punishment are inexorably linked. A progressive racial justice
scholar could conceivably respond to Georgia's racial disparities
by proposing that the state more frequently categorizes blackvictim cases as aggravated murders, without commenting on
the appropriate sentence for aggravated murder. However, it is
unlikely that a progressive scholar would set forth such a
proposal because it would intervene in a legal regime where the
sentence for aggravated murder is death. Similarly, the crux of
the progressive critique of provocation is not about the
theoretical grading of murder but about how murder law
reflects and reinforces gender and racial hierarchy in the real
world. 228 Thus, it seems that provocation theorists assume that
a murder sentence is the fair baseline for unreasonably
provoked killers and see the main problem as state actors and
jurors failing, for discriminatory reasons, to apply that
sentence to enough defendants. 229
The insular nature of provocation analysis may also be a
function of history. Commentators have always deployed the
race and death penalty argument in the name of lenity and as
226. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY
L.J. 753, 845 n.397 (2002) (noting the view that "the question of culpability is
separate and distinct from the question of punishment"); Kahan & Nussbaum,
supra note 31, at 366-72 (distinguishing between guilt and sentencing, asserting
that mercy in sentencing can reduce the harshness of their liability proposal, but
recognizing that the harshness objection poses "the deepest and most interesting
challenge" (id. at 366)).
227. See Joseph Kennedy, supra note 226, at 845 (asserting that people make
moral decisions "with an eye towards what is at stake").
228. See supra note 58 and accompanying text; Anthony Alfieri, Prosecuting
Race, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1194 (1999) ("Postulating alternative theories of
objectivity and violence, critical race theorists make claims that undermine the
standard gauge of colorblind neutrality, and reconfigure the stock construction of
racial violence.").
229. See REASONABLE MAN, supra note 12, at 278 (stating that ratcheting up
"makes particular sense when the defendant has taken another human being's
life").
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part of a larger institutional objection to capital punishment. 230
By contrast, over the last several decades, legal experts have
paid far less attention to non-death murder sentences and
virtually no attention to the role the provocation defense plays
in the general distribution of punishment for murder. 231 As a
result, the progressive criticism of provocation responds
primarily to individual instances of gender-biased and facially
unjust leniency. 232 Moreover, many critical race scholars

condemn the severity of the death penalty because of its
historical connection to white domination and African
American oppression. 233 Conversely, most of the historical
discussion of provocation involves how the doctrine's leniency
reflected and reinforced male domination of women.234
Progressive critics of provocation accordingly concentrate on
how ratchet-up proposals take away unfair advantages from
socially privileged defendants and pay less attention to the
possible burdens on subordinated individuals. 235
Under- and over-enforcement, however, are two sides of
the subordination coin. 236 If favored defendants historically

230. See supra Part III.A.
231. See infra notes 296-300 and accompanying text.
232. See supra Part II.A.
233. See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 162; G. Ben Cohen, McCleskey's Omission:
The Racial Geography of. Retribution, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 65, 66 (2012) ("The
death penalty's historic, continued intersection with race is deep and well
documented."); DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA'S DEATH
PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION 34 (2010) (arguing that "the distinctive forms

of contemporary American capital punishment ... embody a strikingly precise
mirror image of those we see in the lynchings"); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE
CONTRADICTIONS

OF

AMERICAN

CAPITAL

PUNISHMENT

89-115

(2003)

(documenting. correlation between historically high-lynching states and current
high-execution states).
234. See, e.g., Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 31, at 307-10 (asserting that
the traditional provocation categories reflected value judgments conceiving of
women as the property of men); Miller, supra note 12, at 668 (stating that "the
doctrine of voluntary manslaughter continues to perpetuate a violent form of male
subordination of women"). However, a perusal of older history reveals
provocation's role as a check against the harshness of murder sentencing. See
Arthur Lyon Cross, The English Criminal Law and Benefit of Clergy during the
Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries, 22 AM. HIST. REV. 544, 545 (1917).
235. See, e.g., REASONABLE MAN, supra note 12, at 273 (addressing reforms to
the "problem" of "majority culture defendants [being] able to rely on dominant
social norms ... to bolster their claims of reasonableness").
236. See Johnson, supra note 184 ("Historically, underenforcement and
'overenforcement' were inextricably linked in that they both stemmed from
intense racial animosity and extreme power differentials."); I. Bennett Capers,
Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle,
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have been able to use provocation to avoid murder charges, just
as whites who killed blacks were able to avoid the noose, one
fairly could expect history to be replete with instances of
disfavored defendants or those who kill favored victims (i.e.
black men who killed white men or women) being barred ex
ante from invoking provocation. 2 37 But we do not talk about
those defendants. In fact, we do not know about those
defendants. Statistics on the global effects of restricting the
provocation defense are extremely difficult to unearth. 23 8
Nevertheless, there is evidence that leading provocation law
critics are recognizing the importance of institutional
reasoning. 2 39 In a footnote of a 2004 book review, Professor
Nourse makes the following statement:
Any reform [of provocation] would, however, have to
understand the position of the defense within the larger
scheme of homicide law: some jurisdictions, for example, use
provocation to reduce first- to second-degree homicide and
provocation may exist as an important safety valve
restricting the potential for the death penalty; in other
jurisdictions, provocation may act as a kind of antidote for
stringent self-defense rules. These latter factors are why
proposals for abolition may be far too simple. 240

46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) ("Racial minorities face the double bind of
being subject to both underenforcement and overenforcement.").
237. In the rape context, feminists emphasize the history of underenforcement
of rape laws stemming from male sexual privilege. See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson,
From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape
Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51 (2002). But there is another historical
story about the overenforcement of rape laws against black men. See Angela P.
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
599 (1990) (observing that for many black women, rape has come to "signif[y] the
terrorism of black men by white men, aided and abetted ... by white women");
Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 359, 366 (1993) ("Black men's supposed propensity to rape white women
became the pretext for thousands of brutal lynchings in the South.").
238. See Difficult Subject, supra note 57, at 976 n.77 (noting the lack of
empirical evidence on the utilization of provocation in intimate violence cases).
239. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
240. V. F. Nourse, Upending Status: A Comment on Switching, Inequality, and
the Idea of the Reasonable Person, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 361, 364-65 n.11 (2004).
Professor Lee also more recently takes the "unpopular position" that defendants
should be allowed to argue provocation on the basis of gay panic because, among
other things, "[o]pen discussion of pernicious ideas is a better way to deal with
such ideas than banning such discussion outright." Gay Panic,supra note 65, at
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The next section endeavors to provide at least a surface
understanding of the "larger scheme of homicide law" and the
provocation defense's position within it.
B. InstitutionalProvocationAnalysis
When Professor Nourse describes provocation as a "safety
valve," she betrays an a priori institutional position against the
death penalty. But what about the murder sentencing regimes
that do not include capital punishment? While capital
punishment has long been a central locus of progressive
objection, few theorists, even those concerned with mass
incarceration, spare discursive space for critiquing murder
sentences. 241 They may reason that murder sentences compose
a minute portion of incarceration overall. 242 Even if this is the
case, capital cases, which are only a fraction of murder cases,
occupy ample space in liberal theorizing. Scholars also might
assume that because the maximum penalties for murder have
always been great (life in prison or execution), murder
sentences remained constant while other sentences exploded.
However, over the past several decades, sentences for murder
have altered radically in ways that might not be obvious to the
casual observer.
Historically, murder sentencing contained two distinct
opportunities for discretion: (1) judicial discretion in setting
minimum and maximum prison terms 243 and (2) parole board

479, 480.
241. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. Perhaps it is because
focusing on murder sentences is of little persuasive value. Yet persuasiveness is
rarely the litmus test for progressive penal theorizing given that most in society
reserve little sympathy for any kind of criminal. See supra note 79; Lynne
Henderson, Co-opting Compassion: The Federal Victim's Rights Amendment, 10
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579, 586 (1998) (noting the popular view that "[d]efendants
are subhuman; they are monsters"); Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text:
Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial CriminalProcess-A Critique of the
Role of the Public Defender and a Proposalfor Reform, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743,
770 (1995) (noting that in the media "criminals are represented as onedimensional demons to be feared and destroyed").
242. Compare ALEXANDER, supra note 216, at 99 (focusing on drug policy as
the cause of mass incarceration and stating "violent crime is not responsible for
the prison boom"), with Forman, supra note 127, at 48 (observing that "more
prisoners are locked up for violent offenses than for any other type").
243. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court has Mangled
American Sentencing Law and How it Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
367, 383 (2010) (discussing the transition from traditional broad judicial
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discretion in granting release from prison. 244 In the past,
virtually all prison sentences were implemented within the
context of statutory parole schemes. Parole statutes stipulated
a certain term of imprisonment (either a fixed time or fraction
of the maximum, typically one-third), after which murder
defendants became eligible for parole. 245 Once a defendant
spent the statutory term in prison, the parole board had
discretion over whether to grant release. When emancipated,
the defendant remained under parole supervision until the
expiration of his sentence. 246 While certain jurisdictions gave
the parole board full discretion after expiration of the statutory
minimum, others permitted judges to prescribe minimum
prison terms. 247
sentencing discretion for murder convictions to a regimented regime under the
SRA). Of course, in capital cases utilizing jury sentencing and those with
mandating life or execution statutes, judges could not set minimum or maximum
sentences.
244. See Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth:
Judicial Sentence Modification as a PromisingMethod of Early Release, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 465, 481 (2010) (observing that modern sentencing reform
restricted the traditional discretion of parole boards).
245. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
223, 226 (1993) (observing that historically "parole authorities were assigned the
task of determining the actual release date for most federal prisoners"). See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-18-7(3) (West 1963) (permitting life offender to be
paroled after ten years); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-610(2) (1977) (same); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 47-7-3 (1972) (permitting life offender to be paroled after serving 1/3 of the
sentence); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-17-24(1) (West 1964) ("[plrisoners may become
eligible for parole hearing after they have completed one-third of their minimum
sentence . .. ."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57,

§

332.7 (West 1950) (same); W. VA.

CODE ANN. § 62-12-13(4) (LexisNexis 1966) (same).
246. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.12 (West 1979) ("The period of parole
shall be equivalent to the maximum term for which the prisoner was sentenced
less calendar time actually served on the sentence."); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1218 (LexisNexis 1961) ("The period of parole shall be the maximum of any
sentence.").
247. See Jon 0. Newman, ParoleRelease Decisionmaking and the Sentencing
Process, 84 YALE L. J. 810, 818 (1975) (describing federal sentencing at the time,
which permitted judges to choose: (1) regular sentencing that made the defendant
eligible for parole after one-third of the sentence (the most common), (2) a
sentence where the inmate was immediately eligible for parole and the board had
sole discretion, or (3) a minimum sentence term of less than one-third of the
maximum imposed). Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-125 (West 1960); N. M.
STAT. ANN. § 41-17-6 (West 1954); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.12 (West 1979); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 62-12-13 (LexisNexis 1966) (permitting judges to set maximum
prison terms only and granting parole board discretion to parole after expiration
of statutory minimum), with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4501(b) (West 1974); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 700.00(3)(a) (McKinney 1967); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-1, 105.01(1)
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The criminal sentencing reforms of the late twentieth
century eroded both judicial and parole board discretion. State
efforts to narrow the gap between minimum and maximum
penalties curtailed judges' power to set sentences, and so-called
"truth in sentencing" virtually eliminated parole. 248 Turning to
the truth in sentencing, in 1984, the federal government
enacted the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) as part of a sweeping
package of tough-on-crime measures. 249 The SRA radically
transformed federal sentencing by, among other things,
restricting sentencing to the application of severe guidelines,250
creating an extensive list of mandatory minimum sentences, 251
abolishing parole in favor of fixed terms of supervised release
to be served after, not in lieu of, imprisonment, 252 and
requiring offenders to serve at least 85 percent of their
sentences. 253 In 1994, Congress authorized the attorney
general to award grants to states to similarly revise their
sentencing schemes, and in 1998, twenty-seven states and the
District of Colombia received grants after making the required
legal revisions. 254 By the turn of the century, forty-two states
had enacted some form of truth in sentencing, with twentyeight states and the District of Columbia requiring defendants
to serve at least 85 percent of their sentences. 255 Even in states

(2012) (giving judges discretion to prescribe minimum terms).
248. See Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Legislatures, Judges, and Parole
Boards: The Allocation of Discretion Under Determinate Sentencing, 62 FLA. L.
REV. 1037, 1043 (2010) (observing that "reforms aimed to directly reduce the
discretion of either judges or parole boards").
249. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.A. & 28 U.S.C.A.); Stith &
Koh, supra note 245, at 265-66.
250. See SRA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (West 2013); Stith & Koh, supra note 245, at
259-60; Dharmapala et al., supra note 248, at 1040; Robert G. Lawson, Difficult
Times in Kentucky Corrections-Aftershocks of a 'Tough on Crime" Philosophy, 93
KY. L.J. 305, 318 (2004) (asserting that the United States sentencing guidelines
"proved to be less about correcting disparities than. . . increasing the severity of
criminal penalties') (internal quotations omitted).
251. See SRA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559 (West 2013).
252. See SRA, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3621 & 3583 (West 2013); Stith & Koh, supra
note 245, at 236.
253. See SRA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621 & 3624 (West 2013); PAULA M. DITTON &
DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 3 (1999), available at http://
bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf (study on truth in sentencing).
254. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 13702
(West 2013); see DITTON & WILSON, supra note 253, at 1.
255. See DITTON & WILSON, supra note 253, at 2, Table 1. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV.
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that preserved parole, parole boards became increasingly
unwilling to grant release. 256
In addition, since the 1970s, states have steadily raised
murder's statutory minimum and maximum sentences. For
first-degree murder, the penalty historically has been death or
life imprisonment at the discretion of judges and juries. 257
Thus, tough-on-crime political actors did not have the option to
argue for greater severity through higher maximum penalties.
States were, however, able to increase mandatory minimums,
and over the past several decades, they doubled, tripled, and
even quadrupled the amount of time a person convicted of first
degree murder must spend in jail. 258 Sixteen states have gone

STAT. ANN. § 41-1604.09 (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c) (West 2012);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-125 (2012); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4-1(10) (2012); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.234 (West 2012); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.40 (McKinney
2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.13 (LexisNexis 2012); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9756(b)(1) (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.110 (West 2012); cf.

ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.090 (2012) (prisoner must serve at least two-thirds of
sentence); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 211E § 3(a)(3)(C) (LexisNexis 2012) (offenders
must serve 75 percent of sentence).
256. See Jonathan Simon, How Should We Punish Murder?, 94 MARQ. L. REV.
1241, 1281 (2011) (observing that since the 1980s, parole boards "have become
increasingly reluctant to approve" parole of murderers sentenced to life); ROBERT
WEISBERG, ET. AL., STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER, LIFE IN LIMBO: AN
EXAMINATION OF PAROLE RELEASE FOR PRISONERS SERVING LIFE SENTENCES
WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA 4 (2011) (study finding that life

prisoners in California have an 18 percent chance of being paroled and a murder
defendant sentenced to life and paroled has a 9 percent chance of the parole
decision being reversed by the Governor).
257. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-453(a) (1956); ALA. CODE § 318 (1960
& Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 707 (West 1958) (setting sentence for
first degree murder as death or of life imprisonment "at the discretion of the
jury").
258. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-18-7, 40-2-3(1) (West 1963); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3-102, 18-1.3-401 (West 2012) (raising minimum term for
life offenders from ten years in 1963 to LWOP currently); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
782.04, 775.082 (West 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.04, 921.141 (West 2012)
(raising minimum sentence from twenty-five years in 1992 to LWOP currently);
38 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 9-1 (1964); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/9-1; 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 5/5-1-1 et. seq. (West 2012) (raising minimum sentence from fourteen
years in 1964 to twenty years currently); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.030
(LexisNexis 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.030 (West 2012) (raising minimum
sentence from ten years in 1986 to twenty years currently); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:11-3 (West 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2012) (raising minimum
sentence from fifteen years in 1979 to thirty years currently); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
40A-2-1, 40A-29-2, 41-17-24(4) (West 1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-2-1, 31-18-14,
31-21-10 (West 2012) (raising minimum term for life offenders from ten years in
1964 to thirty years currently); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1257 (West 1961); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.03, 12.31 (West 2012) (raising minimum sentence from
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so far as to specify life in prison without the possibility of
parole (LWOP) as the mandatory minimum for first-degree
murder. 259 To illustrate the acute change, in 1967, defendants
convicted of first-degree murder in South Dakota and
sentenced to life in prison became parole eligible after serving
five years. 260 Today, such offenders must remain in prison for
the remainder of their natural lives, with no possibility of
release. 261
The law of second-degree murder experienced an even
greater transformation. As with first-degree murder, states
boosted minimum prison terms. 262 In South Carolina, for
example, the mandatory minimum sentence for second-degree
murder was ten years in 1977, twenty years in 1985, and thirty

two years in 1967 to LWOP currently); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (1985); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2012) (raising minimum term for life offenders from twenty
years in 1985 to thirty years currently); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-16-12, 23-60-15
(1967); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-16-12, 22-6-1, 24-15A-32 (2012) (raising
minimum term for life offenders from five years in 1967 to LWOP currently).
259. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-401
(West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-35a (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
636, § 4209 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 902.1 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (2012); MASS. GEN, LAWS ANN.
ch. 265, § 2 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.316 (West 2012); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 565.020 (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-105 (West 2012);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-a (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-17 (West
2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102 (West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1
(2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (West 2012).
260. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-60-15 (1967).
261. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1(1), 22-16-12 (2012).
262. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 318 (1960); ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (1982) (raising
minimum sentence from ten years in 1960 to LWOP in 1982); ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§ 12.55.125 (West 1989); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.125 (West 2012) (raising
minimum sentence from five years in 1989 to ten years currently); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190 (West 1970); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West 1988) (raising minimum
sentence from five years in 1970 to fifteen years in 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 635 (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205 (2001) (raising minimum sentence
from ten years in 1995 to fifteen years in 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
200.030(5) (LexisNexis 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.030(5) (LexisNexis
1995) (raising minimum sentence from five years in 1983 to ten years currently);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-24-10 (West 1954); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-2-1, 31-18-15
(West 2012) (raising minimum sentence from three years in 1954 to fifteen years
currently); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115 (1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115 (1999)
(raising minimum sentence from ten years in 1990 to twenty-five years in 1999);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (1985); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-20 (2001) (raising minimum sentence from ten years in 1977 to
twenty years in 1985 to thirty years in 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203
(LexisNexis 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (West 2012) (raising minimum
sentence from five years in 1990 to fifteen years currently).
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years in 2001.263 States also significantly raised the maximum
penalties for second-degree murder.264 For example, from 1963
to today, Pennsylvania increased the maximum sentence for
second-degree murder from twenty years to life in prison.265
Several states raised both statutory minimums and
maximums. 266 New Jersey is exemplary of this shift, where
between 1979 and the present time, the penalty for second
degree murder changed from a range of fifteen to thirty years
to a range of thirty years to LWOP. 267 Finally, states have
consolidated first and second degree murder into a single
category of murder with the potential for ultimate sentences. 268
263. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (1977), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20
(1985), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2012).
264. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-105 (West 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-1.3-401 (West 2012) (raising maximum sentence from twelve years in 1979 to
twenty-four years currently); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 707.3, 902.9 (West 1979); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 707.3, 902.9 (West 2012) (raising maximum sentence from twentyfive years in 1979 to fifty years currently); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW. 27-501
(Flack 1951); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-204 (West 2012) (raising maximum
sentence from eighteen years in 1951 to thirty years currently); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. §12.1-32-01 (West 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-01 (West 1985)
(raising maximum sentence from twenty years in 1976 to thirty years in 1985); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4701 (West 1963); 61 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6137(a)(1)
(West 2012) (raising maximum sentence from twenty years in 1963 to life
currently); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-32, 18.2-10 (1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32
(West 2012) (raising maximum sentence from twenty years in 1975 to forty years
currently); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.50 (West 1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.50 (West
2012) (raising maximum sentence from twenty years in 1982 to sixty years
currently).
265. Compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4701 (West 1963), with 61 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6137(a)(1) (West 2012).
266. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-701, 13-1104 (1978); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-710 (2012) (raising sentence range from seven years determinate in
1978 to 10-25 years currently); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401 (1987); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-4-401 (West 2012) (raising sentence range from 5-20 years in 1987 to 630 years currently); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-3404 (LexisNexis 1975); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-50-2-3 (West 2012) (raising sentence range from 15-25 years in 1975 to 45LWOP or death currently); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2012) (raising sentence range from 15-30 years to 30 years
to LWOP currently); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-7, 15A-1340.17 (1969); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.17 (West 2012) (raising sentence range from 2-30 years in
1969 to 7.8-32.75 years currently); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2408 (1973); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-210, 40-35-111 (West 2012) (raising sentence range from 1020 years in 1973 to 15-60 years currently); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-3 (LexisNexis
1977); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-3 (West 2012) (raising sentence range from 5-18
years in 1977 to 10-40 years currently).
267. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1979), with § 2C:11-3 (West
2012).
268. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (West
2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-3 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020
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For example, in 1960, Alabama's sentence for second-degree
murder was at least ten years imprisonment, at the sentencer 's
discretion. 269 Today, Alabama has one category of murder
carrying a minimum sentence of LWOP and a maximum of
death. 270
The systematic inflating of sentences for violent crimes
like murder produced tremendous changes in the United States
prison population. Between 1990 and 1997, increases in
incarceration rates of violent offenders accounted for 50 percent
of the total increase in the combined state prison population. 271
A study by the Sentencing Project reports an 83 percent
increase in the number of offenders sentenced to life
imprisonment between 1992 and 2003, a statistic made all the
more startling by the fact that the population of life offenders
had already doubled between 1984 and 1992.272 Moreover, the
number of inmates serving life without parole increased 170
percent between 1992 and 2003.273 All in all, between 1970 and
2005, federal and state prison populations have increased by
628 percent. 274
Today, public toleration of, and even support for, long
prison terms continues to be high. In fact, the average person
likely would be astounded that in 1960, South Dakota

(West 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1251 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3
(West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (West 2012).
269. ALA. CODE § 318 (1960).
270. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (2012). Likewise, in 1975, Indiana imprisoned
murder defendants for not less than fifteen and not more than twenty-five years.
IND. CODE ANN. § 10-3404 (LexisNexis 1956 & Supp. 1975). In 1994, this penalty
jumped to a mandatory forty-year sentence. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-3
(LexisNexis 1994). Now, Indiana has only one category of murder that penalizes
defendants with a term of between forty-five and sixty-five years. IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-50-2-3 (West 2012).
271. DITTON & WILSON, supra note 253, at 4.
272. Douglas A. Berman, The Enduring (and Again Timely) Wisdom of the
Original MPC Sentencing Provisions, 61 FLA. L. REV. 709, 712 (2009) (quoting
MARC MAUER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE MEANING OF "LIFE": LONG
PRISON SENTENCES INCONTEXT 11 (2004)).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 711. The Florida Department of Corrections, for example, boasts,
"Violent offenders who have been sentenced to prison under the current minimum
85% of sentence served policy [enacted in 1996], on average, will serve a
significantly longer period of time in prison than at any time over the past 25
years." Time Served by Criminals Sentenced to Florida's Prisons: The Impact of
Punishment Policies from 1979 to 2004, Section 2 (Violent Crimes), FLA. DEP'T OF
CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/timeserv/annual/section2.html (last
visited July 20, 2013).
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permitted the release of murderers after five years. 275 To be
sure, opposing long sentences for murderers is not a popular
position. Nevertheless, as Jonathan Simon argues, "The overall
penalty structure in the U.S. is simply too high, and we should
be unembarrassed to assert that reforming the law of murder is
about reducing it."276 A stroll through the mental health,
hospital, or hospice ward of a prison, bursting at the seams,
would undoubtedly cause a progressive to at least pause before
espousing legal reforms that increase the absolute number of
LWOPs. 277
Yet perhaps the discovery that such geriatric prisoners
include a significant number of sexist, racist, and homophobic
killers properly denied the provocation defense would allay
liberal compassion. The question is: Who are the individuals
that compose the population of murder defendants facing the
most exacting murder sentences in a half-century and seeking
the "safety valve" of a provocation defense? 278 The snapshot of
murder defendants provided here comes directly from the FBI's
Bureau of Justice Statistics. It reveals that defendants who
perpetrate intimate homicides of women constitute a small
minority of the total homicide-defendant population. 279
Between 1980 and 2008, roughly 16 percent of all homicides
could be termed intimate homicides. 280 For those homicides,
females composed 64 percent of the victims and 30 percent of
the defendants. 28 1 If every one of the female victims of
homicide was killed by a male, male-on-female intimate
homicides would constitute approximately 10 percent of all
homicides. Factor in female-on-female homicides and
accidental, properly justified, and uncontroversially provoked
killings, and the world of unreasonably . passionate male

275.
276.
277.

See supra note 260.
Simon, supra note 256, at 1311.
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND

OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 1 (2003), available at www.hrw.org/sites/

default/files/reports/usalOO3.pdf (calling the treatment of mentally ill offenders in
U.S. prisons a human rights violation); Lyle B. Brown, The Joint Effort to
Supervise and Treat Elderly Offenders: A New Solution to a Current Corrections
Problem, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 259, 272-75 (1998) (discussing the challenges of
incarcerating elderly offenders).
278. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
279. See COOPER & SMITH, supra note 200, at 18.
280. Id. at 18 (Table 9).
281. Id. at 10 (Table 5).
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intimate killers becomes quite small. 282 Thus, the great
majority of murder defendants who might seek to utilize the
provocation defense do not appear to be the wife abusers that
commentary. 283
scholarly
in
prominently
figure so
Consequently, progressive provocation reforms that generally
narrow the defense are likely to have distributional effects far
broader than those anticipated by reform advocates.
A perusal of other studies also bears out that murder
defendants are not generally the powerful and privileged actors
about whom provocation critics worry. First, homicide appears
to be a phenomenon of youth, with the vast majority of
homicide offenders and victims under the age of thirty-five. 284
The FBI reports that in 2005, offenders between eighteen and
twenty-four-years-old committed more homicides than any
other age group (37 percent), and individuals under the age of
twenty-four composed nearly half of all homicide defendants. 285
Although the Supreme Court declared recently in Miller v.
Alabama that mandatory life without parole for juveniles
convicted of murder is cruel and unusual punishment, life
sentences for such defendants remain fair game. 286 Miller also
leaves open the possibility that judges may assess LWOP to
juvenile murder defendants after a hearing, 287 and the case
does not alter the fact that youthful offenders over seventeen
282. The FBI report unfortunately has no information on victim/offender
gender combinations. In addition, it compiles data on homicide rates from surveys
of police departments. Although it exempts from the statistics killings deemed
justifiable by the police, it does not account for trial outcomes. See id. at 34
(methodology).
283. See Difficult Subject, supra note 57, at 976 (observing that "the victims of
male violence are more often than not other men" and "the provocation defense
benefits men, but so do all other excuse and justification defenses, most of which
are not considered controversial, because men, far more often than women, kill
people for all reasons"). In addition, few would dispute that gay panic killings are
relatively rare events. Cf. Lila Shapiro, Highest Number Of Anti-Gay Murders
Ever Reported In 2011: The National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs,THE
HUFFINGTON POST (June 2, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/
02/anti-gay-hate-crimes-murders-national-coalition-of-anti-violence-programs-n
1564885.html (reporting a total of "30 fatally violent hate crimes" against LGBT
people in 2011).
284. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdffhtius.pdf (Age
Trends Chart: Victims and Offenders by Demographic Group, 1976-2005).
285. Id.
286. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
287. Id. at 2475 (requiring a consideration of mitigating circumstances before
imposing LWOP).
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years of age continue to face LWOP and even execution. 288
Moreover, the population of homicide defendants largely is
composed of men of color. FBI data reveals that between 1980
and 2008, African Americans constituted 52.5 percent of
homicide defendants. 289 Although the report does not further
divide the "white" 45.3 percent of defendants into Latino and
non-Latino, a fact that has garnered criticism from race
scholars, 290 other statistics are telling. 291 Reports from the
Bureau of Justice Statistics on the characteristics of felony
defendants in the seventy-five largest counties include a
"Hispanic" category. 292 In 2006, the most recent year analyzed,
blacks constituted 67 percent of "murder" defendants,
Hispanics made up 22 percent, and white "non-Hispanics"
represented the remaining 10 percent. 293 Thus, a foray into
demography demonstrates that the group most likely to be
burdened by the elimination or limitation of the provocation
defense is young men of color accused of non-intimate
homicides and facing murder charges in one of the most
punitive systems on earth.294
Statistics on the percentage of murder defendants who
288. Youthful offenders and juveniles sentenced as adults are routinely mixed
with the general prison population. Andrea Wood, Cruel and Unusual
Punishment: Confining Juveniles with Adults after Graham and Miller, 61 EMORY
L.J. 1445, 1458-59 (2012) ("On any given day, thousands of juveniles are housed
with adult offenders in jails and prisons... . Between 1990 and 1999, the number
of juveniles held in adult jails increased by more than 300%."); JAMES AUSTIN ET
AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL

ASSESSMENT, NCJ182503, 5, Table 2 (Oct. 2000), available at https://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bja/182503.pdf.
289. COOPER & SMITH, supra note 200, at 12 (Table 7).
290. See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE,
ETHNICITY, AND CRIME IN AMERICA 19 (2012) (noting that "using a 'white/black'

classification system results in an overcount of non-Hispanic whites in prison and
an undercount of Hispanics").
291.

See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, HISPANIC PRISONERS IN THE UNITED

STATES (August 2003), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/
publications/inc hispanicprisoners.pdf (finding that Hispanic men are almost four
times as likely to go to prison as whites; Hispanics are the fastest growing
population in prison; and they face conviction and incarceration at much higher
rates than whites).
292. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULLETIN, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006, NCJ 228944,

19 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf.
293. Id. at 19 (Appendix Table 2).
294. See COOPER & SMITH, supra note 200, at 16 (finding that "[y]oung males
(14 to 24 years-old), particularly young black males, were disproportionately
involved in homicide compared to their proportion of the population").
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request voluntary manslaughter instructions are difficult to
find, and original empirical research on that particular issue is
beyond the scope of this article (and the competency of its
author). Nevertheless, some existing data indicates that
narrowing provocation would burden defendants other than
privileged sexists and homophobes. 295 Psychologist Stuart
Kirschner and his co-authors studied MPC-style extreme
emotional disturbance defense (EED) cases in New York over a
ten-year period. 296 They found that, in general, "men who kill
women who have left them are not able to plead successfully an
EED defense." 297 Rather, prosecutors and juries "may be more
receptive to EED claims when the defendant, in a highly
emotional state, killed or tried to kill in response to physical
victimization, or an understandable fear of physical
victimization, by the victim; or when there were other
extenuating circumstances." 298 Moreover, there is an intuitive
and anecdotally supported answer to the question of which
murder defendants utilize broad provocation defenses: all who
can benefit from it. 299 Upon asking a defense attorney the types

295. See infra notes 296-298 and accompanying text.
296. Kirschner et al., supra note 94.
297. Id. at 131.
298. Id. at 130-31.
299. Defendants pursue voluntary manslaughter verdicts in a variety of
scenarios outside of separation killing and gay panic contexts. See, e.g., People v.
Manriquez, 123 P.3d 614 (Cal. 2005) (defendant sought provocation defense for
killing victim after victim called him "motherfucker" and taunted him to use gun);
People v. Roman, No. B208461, 2010 WNL 2179713 (Cal. Ct. App. June 1, 2010)
(provocation defense pursued by defendant who killed victim after bar fight);
People v. Memory, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 353 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (defendant convicted
of voluntary manslaughter for killing during a bar fight); People v. Khun, No.
C058566, 2009 WL 1383686 (Cal. Ct. App. May 18, 2009) (defendant convicted of
voluntary manslaughter for killing during a gang fight); People v. Brooks, 185
Cal. App. 3d 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (defendant sought voluntary manslaughter
instruction for killing a man he believed shot his brother); Webb v. State, 663
S.E.2d 690 (Ga. 2008) (defendant sought provocation defense for killing two
friends during a drunken argument); Ellis v. State, 508 N.E.2d 790 (Ind. 1987)
(defendant sought provocation defense for killing after a bar fight); State v. Green,
127 P.3d 241 (Kan. 2006) (defendant convicted of voluntary manslaughter for
killing in bar parking lot); State v. Purnell, 601 A.2d 175 (N.J. 1992) (defendant
sought provocation instruction for killing following a "drug deal gone sour"); State
v. Perry, 590 A.2d 624 (N.J. 1991) (provocation defense sought by defendant drugaddict for killing a fellow drug user who advanced toward defendant while he was
shooting up); State v. Lowry, 424 S.E.2d 549 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (defendant
sought voluntary manslaughter instruction for killing a much larger man who had
been bullying him). There are also cases in which women claim voluntary
manslaughter for killing their controlling and abusive partners. See Difficult
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of murder cases to which the provocation defense applies, one
is unlikely to hear, "I reserve that defense for intimate
homicides and gay panic cases." Rather, the attorney will
probably answer that she pursues the defense in any case
involving plausible victim precipitation and as a perennial
back-up to self-defense. 30 0
CONCLUSION
After all this analysis, including the institutional perusal
of non-capital murder law, where should one stand on George
Zimmerman and homophobic and sexist men who kill? Should
one be happy that Zimmerman was acquitted? Should one
remain unperturbed when judges allow abusers to argue
provocation? Should one rejoice when defendants assert "gay
panic" in courtrooms? Not really. Nothing in this analysis
denies that racist, sexist, and homophobic killings are horrific
events. Academics should cast a spotlight on individual cases
where social hierarchy produces inequality. They should
emphasize that the differentially merciful treatment of
minority-victim killers is conspicuous evidence of intentional,

Subject, supra note 57, at 977 ("Indeed, provocation represents the only (or, at
least, best) partial defense to murder available to battered women who kill their
abusers in many (perhaps most) jurisdictions."); PATRICK A. LANGAN & JOHN M.
DAWSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPOUSE MURDER DEFENDANTS IN
LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, NCJ 153256, (Sept. 1995), available at http://bjs.
(studying all the intimate
ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/asciilSPOUSMUR.TXT
homicides in the nation's seventy-five largest counties and finding that 31 percent
of women defendants were acquitted (as opposed to 6 percent of men) and of the
convicted women, 49 percent were convicted of a lesser charge); see, e.g., McNeil v.
Middleton, 344 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2003) (battered wife defendant pursued
voluntary manslaughter defense); State v. Tierney, 813 A.2d 560 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2003) (battered woman defendant asserted provocation defense); cf.
State v. McClain, 591 A.2d 652 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (woman who shot
abusive ex-boyfriend presented provocation defense).
300. See, e.g., State v. Redmond, 937 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Mo. 1996) ("One who
unreasonably believes that he must use force to defend himself from an imminent
attack or uses an unreasonable amount of force cannot escape conviction on
grounds of self-defense. But, the jury may nevertheless believe that the
confrontation and the showing of the weapon constituted adequate provocation by
the victim, which impaired the defendant's self-control and aroused him to kill in
sudden passion.") (internal citation omitted); Wood v. State, 486 P.2d 750, 752
(Okla. Crim. App. 1971) ("A homicide may be reduced from murder to
manslaughter where the killing was done because the slayer believed that he was
in great danger, even if he was not warranted in such belief . . . ."). See supra note
299 and accompanying text.
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social, institutional, or unconscious bias. However, before
decimating self-defense and eviscerating provocation law,
scholars also might take into account the larger ramifications
of such significant legal changes. 301 There is a natural
temptation to engage the massively powerful criminal system
in an attempt to send a forceful message of gender and racial
equality. However, the anti-subordination benefit of such
message-sending is at best uncertain, whereas "there is a
concrete, demonstrable harm to locking up more and more
people, a disproportionate number of whom are black."302
Yes, killers receive little quarter in the public imagination.
There is no political downside to being tough on killers, as
evidenced by skyrocketing murder sentences. However, the
unpopularity of such defendants never has tempted death
penalty abolitionists to waiver from their position. I invite
provocation scholars to bring that same skeptical, cultural
norm-resistant lens to provocation analysis. Provocation critics'
ratchet-up remedies may produce justice in certain individual
cases, but their effects ripple through a racially and socially
fraught system. 303 In this era of racialized mass incarceration,
progressive theorists no longer have the luxury of proposing
prosecutorial solutions to formal inequality in a vacuum. In the
words of Yogi Berra, "In theory there is no difference between
theory and practice. In practice there is."30 4

301. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an
Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1755 (2012)
(noting the necessity to "move beyond individual identities and discrimination ...
and adopt a more structural and institutional perspective.").
302. Abbe Smith, Burdening the Least of Us: "Race-Conscious" Ethics in
CriminalDefense, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1585, 1599 (1999).
303. See Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and
Policy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1256 (2005) ("Policies meant to increase the
severity of punishments for violent crimes will, in the nature of things,
disproportionately affect black offenders.").
304. Yogi Berra (quoted in Berry, supra note 189, at 688). See also Smith,
supra note 302, at 1600 (asserting that support for prosecutorial solutions to
formal inequality are built on a preference for "the imagined over the real").

